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Over the 2010s, unprecedented policy attention has been brought to universal basic income. The 
proposal of giving all members of a polity a periodic, unconditional and individual cash transfer has 
effectively shifted from the margins to concrete political debates in Europe. This raises new questions 
about how local policy-makers justify basic income in these debates, as public justifications have a 
role in shaping the perceived legitimacy of a policy proposal. Although there has been an expansion 
in basic income research, only a handful of studies have addressed this dimension. 
The aim of the study was to examine how parliamentarians in two European countries, Finland and 
Spain, justify basic income. The case countries were selected on the bases that there has been a 
wide discussion on basic income in the recent decades in both countries, and basic income related 
pilot projects have recently taken place in both. The two countries also have a history of persistent 
long-term unemployment, which has been argued to possibly enhance interest in basic income.  
The study addressed how the purpose of basic income is understood in Finnish and Spanish 
parliamentary debates and to what extent justifications shared similarities across case parliaments. 
The data consisted of plenary sitting documents (N = 104) from Finnish and Spanish parliaments 
that contained at least one mention of basic income over the periods of 2005–2007 and 2015–2017, 
(N = 89 documents from Finland, N = 15 from Spain). The case study approached basic income 
debates from the theoretical perspectives of domestication of global models and epistemic 
governance. Discourse analysis and the epistemic governance framework were utilized to organize 
findings. The goals in arguments for basic income were identified and linked to assumptions about 
the environment, actors, norms, and values they relate to.  
The results presented the three most prevalent discourses according to the purpose of basic income. 
These were i) fixing the safety net, ii) encouraging activity, and iii) emancipation of popular classes. 
In the safety net discourse, the existent social benefits system was perceived to be a result of a 
mismatch of short-term reforms for fixing systemic problems and basic income, in contrast, was 
positioned as a cohesive reform. Work was understood as an increasingly insecure source of income, 
and old group categorizations of benefits receivers as no longer matching with the new situation. The 
activity discourse depicted humans as naturally striving towards activity and basic income as a 
means to enhance work participation. In the emancipation discourse, basic income was a means for 
increasing material independence, which was seen as a necessary precondition for fulfilling 
democratic rights. The safety net discourse was shared in basic income justifications across the case 
parliaments, the activation discourse was specific to Finnish justifications, and the emancipation 
discourse specific to Spanish justifications.  
The activity discourse and the emancipation discourse depict very different ways of understanding 
the purpose and the scope of potential of basic income. Based on the analysis, there is a wide 
consensus among parliamentarians across the case parliaments on the need to streamline the social 
safety net and that working life has changed. The results illustrate the complexities of basic income 
and how it can be conceptualized and justified in various ways. To discuss politics of basic income 
and how the proposal is received in different countries, there is a need for future case studies that 
examine how basic income looks like within local discourses, and how these discourses connect with 
the institutional and political context in which they appear.  
Keywords: basic income, comparative case studies, parliamentary debates, epistemic governance, 
Spain, Finland  
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1. Introduction  
  
Universal basic income, or basic income in short, has made its way to the newspaper headlines 
and to political agendas in the recent years. From Silicon Valley influencers to social movements 
and decision-makers from different parts of the world are expressing interest towards the 
proposal of granting all citizens or residents of a polity a periodical, unconditional cash transfer.  
Not just that – the last decades have also rapidly witnessed several basic income pilots being 
brought forward in India, Namibia, the Netherlands, Canada and Finland among others. In the 
recent years, international news followed the Swiss national referendum on universal basic 
income in 2013, the Finnish government’s announcement of national experiment in 2015, and 
the start and later suspension of the Ontario experiment in 2018 (De Wispelaere, Halmetoja & 
Pulkka 2019, 390). Political parties in Europe – particularly the Greens and different parties on 
the Left, but also some liberal parties from the right –have expressed support for the proposal 
for decades (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017; Chrisp & Martinelli 2019). Although some of 
the recently proposed schemes bear little resemblance to the core dimensions of 
unconditionality, universality and individuality of a basic income, they nevertheless indicate that 
an unpresented number of individual actors and groups around the world are now keen to take 
part in the global discussion on basic income and its variants (see e.g. Chrisp 2017; Haagh 2019; 
Widerquist 2019). 
Basic income has featured in discussions on a wide range of modern-day societal challenges. 
The proposal has been cited for example in discussions about labor market changes, automation, 
environmental issues and rethinking the limits of economic growth, and questions regarding 
just and equal citizenship (see e.g. Raventós 2007; Standing 2017; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 
2017). In Europe, discussions about basic income often evolve around the question of whether 
current benefits systems still prevent poverty and unemployment, while also enabling 
individuals’ autonomy in a context of changing labor markets and diversifying forms of life (see 
Soininvaara 2000, 7). In the most recent spur of debates, basic income has been perceived as a 
tool for renewing benefits systems and to resist austerity politics adopted after the global 
financial crisis of 2008 (see De Wispelaere 2015, 29.)  For some, the recent developments 
indicate that basic income is well on its way in moving from general proposal towards practice, 
while other scholars point out that there are political and institutional bottlenecks, which pose 
important obstacles for prospects of basic income moving up in political agendas (De 
Wispelaere & Noguera 2012; Noguera 2018; Haagh 2019). 
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Basic income can be justified from a variety of normative and practical perspectives and the 
proposal has been capable of attracting support broadly across the ideological spectrum (Perkiö 
2013, 2; De Wispelaere 2015; Chrisp 2017). Simultaneously, basic income has also produced 
intense counter-reactions across the same political divides. It has also been argued that even the 
diverse supporters of basic income often share just a superficial agreement on the most abstract 
version of basic income, effectively hiding fundamental and persistent disagreements that exist 
between them (Crisp 2017; Casassas & De Wispelaere 2011, 125).  
This case study aims to contribute to the literature by conducting a comparison of Finnish and 
Spanish parliamentary debates and justifications for basic income. In 2000s and after the 
economic crisis in 2010s, there have been lively discussions over basic income in both countries 
(Perkiö, Rincón & van Draanen 2019). Finland and Spain have also suffered from long-term 
unemployment, which has been seen as one possible driver of interest in universal basic income 
(Andersson 2000; Groot & van der Been 2000; Andersson & Kangas 2002; Sanzo González 
2011). A growing attention has been drawn to universal basic income in both contexts, as several 
bills have been presented in both countries regarding basic income. In both Spain and Finland, 
the proposal has also been resisted by both individual parliamentarians and political parties 
(Clua-Losada 2011; Koistinen & Perkiö 2014). In this study, the terms basic income or basic 
income proposal will be used when referring to the general definition of basic income, and the 
term basic income scheme(s) when referred to the various practical basic income models. At its 
core, basic income is a universal, unconditional and individual cash transfer delivered 
periodically to the members of a polity. Although there is an ongoing debate about the specifics 
of each of these three basic dimensions, they set the common starting ground for any basic 
income debate. In practice, different characteristics of basic income can be translated into very 
differing basic income schemes.  
Studies on basic income politics have addressed the distinct positions of political parties towards 
basic income (e.g.Van Parijs & Vanderboght 2017; Chrisp & Martinelli 2019) and the problems 
of political coalition building (De Wispelare 2016). Previous studies have pointed out how 
complex political power dynamics play into prospects of basic income and its variants in 
practice.  At the same time, considerably less attention has been paid to how policy-makers 
justify basic income in practical policy debates. Basic income provides an appealing case for 
studying political field battles because at present there is unprecedented policy attention towards 
the proposal but, simultaneously, it has not been implemented in any country yet. 
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Until now, there is only a couple of studies in the field of discursive politics of basic income. 
These include Johanna Perkiö’s (2019) research on framing of basic income in Finnish political 
documents from the 1980s to 2016, and Brian Steensland’s (2008) work on the discursive 
struggle over North American guaranteed income scheme in the 1960s and 1970s political 
documents. Perkiö (2019) argues that discussions about the persistent political struggles around 
basic income cannot be understood thoroughly without knowing how the proposal has been 
presented in different national contexts. Appealing to some aspects of the proposal while 
obscuring other perspectives can have a considerable effect on how the public evaluate basic 
income’s legitimacy (Pulkka 2018).  
In local contexts, policy proposals are not met without contestation, and previous scholarship 
on adoption of global models suggest that local policymakers play an essential role in promoting 
proposals to make them seem fit for a given national context (Alasuutari 2015, 53). From a 
comparative perspective, this thesis aims to understand how local policymakers justify basic 
income. The study asks, 
1) How do politicians in Finnish and Spanish parliaments justify basic income? 
To what extent do justifications for basic income share similarities across the case 
parliaments?  
  
2) How is the purpose of basic income understood in these justifications?  
 
Parliamentary debates give insight into the process of convincing other politicians about a 
policy. Looking at how politicians justify basic income in public arenas such as the parliament 
puts us in the middle of the process of making sense and ‘taming’ (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014b) 
the proposal to local conditions. Party-political power dynamics, such as who happens to be in 
the government to make decisions, of course do impact in practice on what bills are likely to be 
accepted, but among the reasons for considering a policy proposal is whether politicians are 
convinced that the proposal would be desirable, viable and feasible. Parliaments represent a 
forum in which this work of convincing other politicians and the public takes place. 
Important parts of persuading other policy-makers happen of course hidden from the public 
eye, but parliamentary debates are important in another sense precisely because they are public. 
Media outlets and parliamentary debates on basic income are likely to be followed by those 
interested in basic income. Observations of these field battles are used in reports, articles, basic 
income anthologies and public discussions, which in turn produce comparative knowledge on 
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basic income and its prospects. Second, at least some of the general public are likely to listen to 
parliamentary debates or read news articles about these, and to that extend they also have 
repercussions on how the national public comes to understand basic income. Particularly in the 
case of policy proposals that are still quite unknown to the general public, such as basic income, 
these public justifications may play an important role in shaping people’s associations related to 
the proposal (Perkiö, Rincón & van Draanen 2019). 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the main historical developments 
of global basic income discussions and discusses the variety of the dimensions and justifications 
of basic income in more detail. Chapter 3 concentrates on the comparative perspective adopted 
in the study and the developments of the basic income debate in Spanish and Finnish contexts. 
In the summary section of Chapter 3, similarities and particularities of the local discussions are 
drawn together. Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical perspectives of domestication and epistemic 
governance adopted in the study. The collection of the data and the process of organizing 
findings adopting Fairclough & Fairclough’s (2012) framework for practical reasoning is 
described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the results of the closer analysis, organized into three 
subsections according to the three main discourses found, and the study is concluded in a 
discussion in Chapter 7.   
 
 
2. Basic Income: A Proposal on the Move 
 
In order to understand current-day global basic income debates, this section provides an outlook 
into where the discussion emerged in different parts of the world (section 2.1.) and how the 
basic definition of basic income leaves room for a wide variety of different basic income 
proposals and justifications (section 2.2.) As this case study concerns the current European 
context, the section 2.2. is not intended as a comprehensive account of all the context-
dependent debates on basic income or of the historical roots of the proposal, but rather as a 
general upshot of the overall developments. Similarly, the section 2.3. is intended as a general 
upshot of the overarching practical and normative questions that are cited along with basic 
income in such a regular manner, that some of those are likely to appear in the parliamentary 
justifications. 
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2.1.  From Separate Beginnings to a Global Debate  
 
First proposals for some form of unconditional monetary grants to citizens have been traced to 
over 200 years ago in the US and Europe (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). Social reformists 
such as Thomas Paine, Charles Fourier and Juan Luis Vives, striving to combat extreme poverty 
of their own time, have often been cited as loosely conceived predecessors of basic income 
thinking (Raventós 2007; De Wispelaere 2015, 26; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 51-54).  
Some authors connect the ‘prehistorical’ roots more straightforwardly to the perceived waves 
of public discussion on basic income type proposals (Widerquist 2019), while others discuss the 
prehistory as a general conceptual background understanding which exists before the eventual 
contemporary emergence of the basic income proposal (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). The 
narrative connection some made between Paine’s pre-industrial thought and the current-day 
basic income discourse has also been questioned. Louise Haagh (2019, 256-259) for example 
argues that tracing the origins of basic income discussions back to Anglo-liberal economic 
development has given the basic income discourse often a self-proclaimed radical flavor and set 
itself for a task of correcting inequalities beyond the proposal’s likely potential. 
 In any case, these early beginnings are still far away from contemporary basic income debates. 
The actual term basic income in its current sense as an individual, universal and unconditional 
benefit seems to have been first used in 1950s by a political economist George D. H. Cole, when 
he argued that an income should be distributed to every citizen in part as direct payments from 
the state (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 80). Cole and another Oxford economist, James 
Meade, made these individual pleas for a basic income or a “social dividend” among citizens, 
but not much was happening elsewhere in Europe yet in this period (ibid. 81). In the 1960s and 
1970s, proposals with similarities to basic income were debated in the U.S. under different 
names: guaranteed income, minimum income grant and demogrant (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 
2017, 87-91).  In the U.S. in this period there was also a debate mobilized notably by Milton 
Friedman on a negative income tax1, which in terms of retributive outcomes could be similar to 
those of a basic income grant (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017; Widerquist 2019, 36).  
These discussions in the U.S. did not have important repercussions in Europe, apart from the 
negative income tax being studied in a governmental report in France (Widerquist 2019, 36). 
During the 1970s, several academics and individuals, apparently unaware of each other in 
                                         
1 a cash transfer scheme in which tax compensation is given to those falling under a certain threshold, as observed 
at the end of the taxation period. 
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Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark started appealing for a guaranteed income grant as an 
alternative to full employment through continuous economic growth. In 1977, Netherlands 
became the first country in the world in which a political party (a small left-wing party in this 
case) adopted basic income (basisinkomen) to its electoral program. In this regard, Netherlands 
was the only country at the time in Europe with party-politically relevant basic income debate 
(Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 96-97).   
Following the developments that happened in late 1970s, the emergence of contemporary basic 
income debates has been located to the late 1970s or early 1980s Europe and the U.S., with 
some country variation (De Wispelaere 2015; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017; Haagh 2019; 
Widerquist 2019). In 1984, the first national network on basic income, Britain’s Basic Income 
Research group, was formed, followed by the formation of the first cross-national network, 
Basic Income European Network, in 1986. The latter was a result of a gathering of a small group 
of academics and trade unionists of the Charles Fourier Collective, organized as a first 
international get-together of actors supporting basic income in Belgium (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght 2017, 97-98). The formation of an international network facilitated exchange of 
knowledge and comparations on the developments of the debate in different countries. The 
network aims at connecting individuals and groups interested in the proposal (both in favor and 
against), it runs a regular newsletter and has organized international basic income congresses 
every two years and, in the most recent years, every year (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 97-
98). One example of the increased interest in the proposal during the recent decades is that this 
international network (now renamed as Basic Income Earth Network) has rapidly doubled its 
national and regional basic income network affiliates, from 12 national affiliated networks in 
four continents in 2007 to 37 in five continents in 2019 (Raventós 2007, 17; BIEN 2019b).  
Jurgen De Wispelaere (2015) divides the emergence of contemporary basic income debates into 
three waves: first one in the 1980s in the European and U.S. context and the second, in the late 
1990s in the African and Latin-American contexts (De Wispelaere 2015, 28).  The first wave 
emerged in the US as a criticism towards the 1980s changes in social security arrangements 
perceived to be shifting from welfare to workfare policies. It was argued that basic income could 
more efficiently fix gaps in the social security safety net and contribute to shifting the focus 
towards a broader understanding of work in the context of enhanced ecological and economic 
concerns. (De Wispelaere 2015, 28). The second wave appeared in the 1990s in African and 
Latin-American countries where basic income was discussed as a way to push fractioned welfare 
arrangements to consider wider groups of population that were not covered under existent 
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minimum income programs (ibid.). Over the 2000s there had been an enhanced global debate 
on basic income among academics and advocates, facilitated by the emergence of internet, the 
existing international network and the spread of the discussion to new actors and geographic 
areas (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 98). However, only the third wave of basic income 
debates awakened from 2013 onwards has been a distinctively global and public debate (De 
Wispelaere 2015, 28; Haagh 2019).  
In 2013 the Swiss held a Citizen’s Initiative, which lead to a national referendum on giving all 
citizens a €2800 monthly unconditional basic income. The result of the Swiss referendum was 
negative, but it raised public awareness and media coverage on basic income. A similar case was 
that of the European Citizen’s Initiative for universal basic income for which signatures in 28 
European countries were collected between 2012 and 2014, in the end failing to reach the 
minimum number of signatures to continue to the European Commission (De Wispelaere 2015, 
29, 71.) In 2015, Finland’s then newly elected government announced a national basic income 
experiment in its Government Program and attracted widespread international media attention. 
Closely thereafter more experiments were announced, by a coalition of municipalities in the 
Netherlands, the province of Ontario in Canada, four cities in Scotland backed up by the 
Scottish Assembly, an EU-funded pilot project in Barcelona-Besos area in Spain and a number 
of experiments by private organizations such as Give Directly (pilot in Kenya) and Ycombinator 
(USA). (De Wispelaere, Halmetoja & Pulkka 2019, 390.)  
The most recent wave of basic income debates has been distinctively global due to the 
international media attention, widely published grassroots campaigns and the several pilot 
programs planned or rolled out recently (Widerquist 2019, 40-41; Haagh 2019, 258).  If in the 
beginnings of the 1980s basic income mainly discussed among individual academics, politicians 
and activists, currently the range of actors voicing their view in favor of some form of basic 
income is ever wider and more diverse. The recent basic income pilots and experiments have 
shifted the debate to a moment in which the proposal is receiving widespread interest and 
support from influential actors and policy-makers than in any previous periods (De Wispelaere, 
Halmetoja & Pulkka 2019, 390.) To understand growing interest of actors across the political 
spectrum on basic income, the next section discusses the different dimensions and justifications 
of basic income. 
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2.2. One Name – Normative and Practical Differences 
 
There are at least three ways of looking at basic income. Firstly, as the most general level 
proposal as in a universal, unconditional and individual cash transfer. Secondly, as a variety of 
more concrete proposals, in which the basic dimensions and additional ones are discussed and 
developed into a more detail, for example in academic literature or in political documents. 
Thirdly, on the basis of different dimensions of basic income it is possible to formulate a myriad 
of concrete, practical basic income schemes which can vary substantially from each other.  
One of the most cited general definitions for basic is by the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN 
2019a): ‘a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without 
means-test or work requirement’. This means that basic income is received by everyone 
independent from other sources of income or the activities they engage in. Building from here, 
there are several often unvoiced, but generally assumed characteristics that a basic income 
scheme would have. It is argued that basic income should not be withdrawn from the recipient 
without due legal process and that it should be paid in cash rather than for example ear-marked 
vouchers. These cash transfers should be done in predictable, regular intervals. Basic income 
payments should continue throughout one’s life cycle, although the amount could vary 
according to age for example by providing smaller amounts to young people and larger amounts 
to pensioners. (De Wispelaere 2015; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017.) As with any policy 
proposal there are ongoing debates about these dimensions, but for the purpose of this study it 
can be concluded that the aforementioned characteristics are widely accepted among scholars. 
These dimensions already lay out the overarching dimensions a basic income is generally 
expected to have. At the same time these do not say anything about many crucial dimensions 
that affect the proposal, such as the level of basic income, the ways of funding it and whether it 
would be built on top of existent benefits programs or whether it would replace some or most 
of them (see De Wispealere 2015). This largely explains the fact that there are basic income 
supporters and opponents across the ideological spectrum (Chrisp & Martinelli 2019).  Indeed, 
there have been pleas for a basic income from replacing all other social benefits schemes and 
most public services (Murray 2008) to pursuing the highest possible basic income that is 
sustainable, complemented with free or heavily subsidized public services (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght 2017, 104). As argued by De Wispelaere (2015, 73), more progressive or 
conservative proponents of basic income are likely to pitch different levels of basic income and 
respond differently to the question of what other programs basic income should replace. 
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Different understandings about these dimensions of basic income and the institutional 
environment may be coupled with a variety of different lines of justification for basic income 
by parliamentarians. 
Like in the case of discussing any reform, concrete justifications for basic income would appeal 
to either the normative desirability, or to its practical feasibility, or both (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght 2017). The aim of the study is not to justify for basic income, but since the 
practical and normative perspectives on basic income will emerge in the parliamentary debates, 
some general points are useful. Essentially, justifications of any reform entail diagnostics of the 
situation at hand and some goals to reach and, in this sense, they always necessarily involve a 
normative dimension. For example, it is often argued that basic income could affect issues 
related to poverty and inequality, unemployment, general wellbeing or individual freedom of 
choice (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017).  The successfulness of these types of claims firstly 
depend on whether others can accept that these states of affairs such as poverty exist per se, 
and whether there the goals related to these could be accepted as desirable. Simon Birnbaum 
(2019, 508-509) notes that some general considerations in defense of basic income appeal to the 
values of humanity and utility, that is, reducing human suffering and improving individuals’ 
overall wellbeing or happiness. In practice, these types of general goals boil down to complex 
practical issues to be tackled; there are always many possible measures to be taken, and the 
strong assumption of scarce allocable resources generally limits the range of options for actions 
deemed as possible. (Birnbaum 2019, 511.) As posed by Birnbaum (2019, 511), even if the 
overall objectives are accepted, there are still at least two questions which are left open for 
justification.  
Firstly, there is a question of whether a basic income is needed, and secondly whether it would 
be fair. Justifications from the perspective of need would appeal to basic income’s target-
efficiency, namely that other measures would not be more effective or cost-efficient in achieving 
the goals, and without causing undesirable side-effects. (ibid.) There is a variety of different 
perspectives to the question of fairness and basic income, but one specifically strong principled 
question regarding fairness and normative desirability of basic income consistently appears in 
basic income debates. It concerns a particular group of potential beneficiaries, namely the 
question of able-bodied adults capable of working and whether they should be entitled to 
unconditional transfers (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 99; Birnbaum 2019, 512). This 
question is expressed across different social context in the form of ‘work ethic’ or the generally 
shared perception that individuals should contribute to the society sincerely according to their 
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capabilities in exchange for others doing so too (De Wispelaere & Noguera 2012, 28). This has 
also been called the norm of reciprocity, namely that people are willing to cooperate with others 
similarly disposed to them, but also to punish those actors that violate the generally accepted 
social norms (Bowles & Gintis 1998). Telling of the centrality of this issue is that the question 
of reciprocity and work ethic is addressed in most, if not all, academic texts that touch upon 
normative (un)desirability of basic income (see e.g. Standing 2017; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 
2017; Birnbaum 2019). Surveys and focus group discussions to measure the publics’ perception 
of whether someone is ‘deserving’ of welfare provisions indicate that the value of work remains 
central (van Oorschot 2000; Laenen, Rossetti & van Oorschot 2019), and as basic income could 
challenge this, it is likely that justifications need to address this particularly common objection 
in some way. 
 
3. Comparative Perspectives to Basic Income Debates  
  
 
This chapter begins with explaining the comparative perspective adopted in the study, and 
research ethical considerations related to my own position as a writer. Thereafter, the selection 
of Finnish and Spanish parliaments as cases for analyzing parliamentary basic income 
justifications is discussed. The following sections 3.1. and 3.2. describe the general 
developments of basic income discussions in Spain and in Finland respectively, and the chapter 
is concluded with a short summary drawing together similar features of the basic income 
discussion across the two case countries. 
As mentioned, basic income in contemporary policy-making has been presented as an answer 
to a wide array of current social and economic challenges. Many of these challenges, such as 
poverty, unemployment or automation, appear widely discussed from one national context to 
another even if they may be articulated as issues a nation-state is facing. It has been argued that 
much of social scientific research is bound to methodological nationalism which makes it hard 
to consider the interdependencies among nation-states and how these nation-states themselves 
have been shaped using international comparisons in policy-making (Kettunen 2008, 17; 
Alasuutari & Qadir 2016b). The challenge is to travel beyond the otherwise default “national 
gaze” through acknowledging these independencies (Kettunen 2008, 12, 94). The compared 
basic income justifications are connected both to local developments and to the transnational 
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basic income discussion. In this regard, the context of the basic income debate is perceived as 
local and transnational at the same time. 
A comparative case study allows to analyze possible similarities in social and economic 
challenges discussed alongside with basic income, as well as the particularities of the two local 
contexts. Kettunen (2008, 19) argues that methodologically, a researcher should strive to 
examine one’s own culture as “a familiar foreign country”. This has two-fold implications for 
an analysis conducted. As a writer, I may have blind spots for capturing widely held assumptions 
in my own cultural context due to my own background understandings. On the other hand, as 
a foreigner to the Spanish context, regardless of the time spent learning and living in the country, 
there can be aspect that I am not able to capture in the analysis. Acknowledging my own 
placement in relation to the work conducted, I have strived to overcome some of the most 
obvious obstacles by very carefully studying the case countries institutional, political and 
sociocultural contexts. 
Considering that this study is a comparative case study in the field of sociology, there is one 
particularly strong strand of cross-national comparative tradition in sociological and social 
policy research that deserves an additional notion here. This is the comparative orientation 
comparing different welfare state types, regimes or models, usually influenced by Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) analytical typology between liberal, conservative and social-democratic 
welfare regimes. This study is not concerned with explaining justifications for basic income 
through these distinctions, but the influence of this field of research in public and academic 
discussions has been so strong that implicit assumptions related to these typologies should be 
bared in mind. Separating nation-states or welfare states to units of analysis also enables ranking 
them in a hierarchy and giving them characteristics, such as ‘forerunner’, ‘competitive’ or 
‘emerging’ in public discussions as well as in academic research (Leena Tervonen-Gonçalves 
2013, 77-78). Academic literature and comparative studies are not, then, free from perceiving 
world’s societies as a hierarchy, within which different nation-states strive to “advance” towards 
“better” nation-states along the lines of the ethos of modernization (Alasuutari 2015, 16). The 
challenge is to contribute to a cross-cultural understanding of social processes in a way that goes 
above and beyond a comparison between assumed “national blocs”, which are often, 
unconsciously or not, placed in some hierarchical order. Aiming to understand how a specific 
policy issue is addressed in two different national parliamentary settings, the study is located as 
a case-oriented cross-cultural policy comparison (Tervonen-Gonçalves 2013, 60-62). 
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Finnish and Spanish parliamentary debates were selected for this case study first of all because 
these represent European countries in which there have been lively discussions on basic income 
during the last two decades (Perkiö, Rincón & van Draanen 2019). In these two countries, 
academics and policy-makers have played a central role in formulating proposals for basic 
income, compared to for example with Germany in which grassroot movements have been 
more important (Perkiö 2013). This makes them apt for studying particularly the parliamentary 
debates in which policy-makers have the stage. Secondly, these two countries represent cases in 
Europe in which long-term unemployment has prevailed both during the 2000s of economic 
prosperity and in the 2010s after the financial crisis (albeit much more severely in Spain). Basic 
income is very commonly cited along with issues related to work and unemployment, and it has 
been argued that basic income may have more support in contexts with high levels of 
unemployment (Andersson & Kangas 2002). Thirdly, the two also represent state-of-the-art in 
the recent years’ developments in the basic income discussion in that in both countries there 
has been a basic income related pilot conducted in the 2010s (Perkiö, Rincón & van Draanen 
2019). This would also indicate that in these countries there is, at least to some extent, some 
invested political interest in the proposal.  
The purpose here is not to study the institutional fit of basic income in the case countries, but 
existing benefits systems, or at least actors’ perceptions of them, form part of the background 
understandings in parliamentary debates on any potential benefits system reform. As outlined 
in Chapter 2, a basic income scheme, depending on its level and other specific features, could 
replace or top up a variety of existing benefits in a given polity. The most central cash benefits 
schemes in comparison with basic income are those that cover working-age population. The 
next two subsections 3.1. and 3.2. mention these existing minimum benefit schemes in the two 
case countries and describe general developments of basic income discussions in Spain and 
Finland. 
 
3.1. Basic Income in the Spanish Context  
 
Basic social assistance benefits to people in working age in Spain are composed of parallel 
systems of a state level system and regional social assistance. These include a temporary 
unemployment benefit at a low level and different regional minimum income schemes2.  
                                         
2 Minimum income schemes overall in Europe are benefits that are intended as last resort support for those adults 
who are not entitled to social insurance payments. These benefits are considered normally on a household basis 
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(Noguera 2018; Sanzo González 2017).  Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous 
communities and based on Spanish Constitution, governments of the autonomous communities 
can take legal and budgetary control over their social assistance schemes. The autonomous 
communities have generally used this right, and at present each region has their own minimum 
income scheme, with very varying levels of coverage and amount, eligibility criteria and the 
activation measures attached to them. (Noguera 2018, 2, 7.) In most regions, the minimum 
income benefit is limited in duration and therefore there is no ultimate last resort benefit which 
would offer economic security for Spanish working age population as whole (Sanzo González 
2011, 292-293; Sanzo Gónzalez 2018.) Current schemes take the household into account 
whereas basic income would be individualized, and the distributive effect of proposed basic 
income schemes in Spain would mean that much more people would become net beneficiaries 
(Noguera 2018, 45).  
Before the 2000s, universal basic income started to appear to the Spanish debates in several 
minor discussion fields. First appearances of basic income in the Spanish literature seem to date 
to 1991, when the Foundation for Marxist Investigations (Fundación de Investigaciones 
Marxistas) edited transcriptions of conferences in which the proposal, based on the proposition 
of Robert van der Veen and Philippe Van Parijs, had been debated in the Spanish context (Pérez 
2015, 336). In 1993 the Green party of Castilla included a basic income inspired proposal into 
their electoral program. In 1996, a citizen’s initiative was represented in the Bask regional 
parliament which included a recommendation for the recognition of a (non-universal) basic 
income as a citizen’s right at the minimum for those outside of the labor market. An association 
for basic income (AREBA, Asociación Renta Básica) was created in 1996 and in 1998, the first 
gathering of basic income were held in Barcelona. (Pérez 2015, 336-337.)  
A couple of years later in 2001, a national Basic Income Network (Red Renta Básica) was 
established to enhance investigation and general awareness of the proposal (Raventós, Wark & 
Casassas 2012, 136-137; Pérez 2015, 338-339). The participants in the first Symposium of the 
national Basic Income Network included academics, trade union representatives from the main 
unions, members of social movements and a few left-wing politicians from the eco-socialist 
Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds), the social-democratic party The 
Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and The Spanish Socialist 
                                         
and they include means-testing, which means that eligibility on whether the applicant has no other or insufficient 
means of financial support. These frequently also include strict conditionality rules on actions that the recipient 
must take to receive the benefit. (Frazer & Marlier 2016, 5-6, 15, 17-18.) 
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Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE). After the first Symposium held in 
Barcelona in 2001, the national Basic Income Network has organized new conferences on an 
annual basis. (Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012, 137.)  Over the period of 2002 to 2005 there 
were also five basic income schemes proposed by academics in Spain. Overall objectives of 
different schemes related to reducing stigma and poverty, rationalizing social benefits system 
and tackling issues of unemployment and precarity. (Perkiö 2013.) 
Over the 2000s, several basic income bills were presented in Spanish autonomous communities 
and two in the Spanish national parliament. The first bill related to basic income was debated in 
2002 in the Catalonian parliament. It set the reference point for the two following bills presented 
in the Spanish parliament in years 2005 and 2007. (Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012, 137.) Both 
legislative bills presented in the national parliament proposed to introduce a basic income above 
poverty threshold in the Spanish territory. The bills of 2005 and 2007 were drafted in highly 
similar terms, and they were also very similar to the first bill presented in the Catalonian 
parliament in 2002 (Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012, 137-140). The legislative bills of 2005 and 
2007 in the Spanish national parliament were presented by the pro-independence Catalonian 
party The Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the leftist-green coalition party United Left- 
Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, IU-ICV). The 
bills emphasized universal basic income as means to ending poverty, preventing stigmatization, 
increasing autonomy and freedom as well as rationalizing the minimum-income benefits system 
(ibid. 138). Although the bills were rejected, the parliamentary debates around the bills sparked 
considerable public interest and media coverage on basic income, and in 2007 resulted in 
establishing a subcommittee for studying the viability of a basic income at the state level in Spain 
(Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012, 140-141).  
During the years of the deepest economic crisis in Spain there was a double shift in basic income 
debates. It virtually disappeared from party politics while interest in the proposal arouse 
considerably within Spanish civil society movements. (Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012.) Claims 
for basic income were sparked again due to large welfare budget cuts in public services and 
social investment policies, and due to new political actors to the party-political map in this time 
(Noguera 2018). Universal basic income re-gained considerable attention particularly though 
the Spanish 15-M movement and Podemos, which as a newly emerged Leftist party took 
universal basic income into their program for the 2014 European elections (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght 2017, 192; Noguera 2018, 3).  
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Noguera (2018, 3-4) describes how Podemos’s surprising success in votes and polls lead to the 
media and television to scrutinize the party’s electoral program and the proposed basic income. 
This led to subsequent prime-time TV talk shows, in which basic income was overwhelmingly 
criticized as a utopian, populist and unfinanceable proposal for a state that had been close to a 
bankruptcy two years before. Although critical cuts in welfare spending under the crisis 
generated public interest in basic income, the proposal was also severely criticized as 
economically unfeasible and a barrier for reversing crucial cuts done in other fields such as 
health services, education, and elderly care. (Noguera 2018, 5-6.)  For the following national 
elections, thereafter, Podemos gave two external economists the task of designing a more 
throughout benefit scheme, one minimum income guarantee and another one for basic income. 
The former scheme won, and they shifted from a basic income proposal to a conditional 
guaranteed income program as a more publicly defendable stepping stone towards basic income. 
(Pérez 2015; Noguera 2018, 3-4.) 
In the Spanish context, particularly the Catalonian region has played a central role in advocating 
basic income in the political field. Implementing a universal basic income would necessarily 
entail a taxation reform but, since the autonomous communities do not hold sufficient 
autonomous fiscal capacity, they could not bring basic income into practice without the 
willingness of the national parliament (Clua-Losada 2011, 177). One of the most predominant 
justifications for basic income in the Spanish context has been that it would constitute an 
efficient means to combat social exclusion and poverty, caused by long-term unemployment 
(Clua-Losada 2011, 177). On the other hand, the basic income has been challenged as a threat 
to full employment and the right to work, which still are still highly held ideals also in leftist 
sectors (ibid.). Noguera (2018) notes that the discussion around basic income during the period 
of 2014-2016 produced more public interest towards income guarantee programs in general, 
pushing other Spanish national parties to present their own alternative proposals. Perhaps in 
part due to this, guaranteed income proposals with loosened behavioral conditions and means-
testing than in the minimum income schemes are increasingly presented in the Spanish political 
agenda (ibid.).   
Like other countries in which there has been vivid discussions around basic income, the 
proposal seems to come and go in waves of interest, appearing to the political agenda and then 
disappearing again after a couple of years, going back to a political anti-climax (Clua-Losada 
2011, 182-183; Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012; Noguera 2018). During the most recent years, 
there has been a regional guaranteed minimum income pilot project in the Catalonian area of 
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Barcelona-Besos, which has been linked to the basic income discussion (Perkiö, Rincón & van 
Draanen 2019). A recent analysis on Spanish newspapers described that news on basic income 
in 2017 were most often framed in relation to automation and the idea that artificial intelligence 
may be taking away jobs (Perkiö, Rincón & van Draanen 2019). Basic income justifications have 
also been influenced by philosophical reflections of freedom as lack of domination, emphasizing 
that democratic citizenship requires material independence (Raventós 2007; Raventós, Wark & 
Casassas 2012, 144).  
 
3.2. Basic Income in the Finnish Context  
 
In the Finnish context there are multiple social benefits for different target groups that a basic 
income could replace or top up. A basic income corresponding to minimum social benefits 
received by an unemployed person after taxes could be set to replace parts of unemployment 
benefits and basic social assistance, but it would also be higher than for example the current 
student allowance, the minimum level parental leave benefit or minimum level sickness 
allowance. In addition, it would make some new groups such as small entrepreneurs and 
freelance workers beneficiaries (Perkiö 2016, 13.) In Finland, working-age people that do not 
fill the working history requirements, or have already used maximum time of either the earnings-
related unemployment benefit or the basic unemployment benefit, are left receiving labor-
market subsidy which is unlimited in duration (Halmetoja, De Wispelaere & Pulkka 2018, 5). 
Labor market subsidy used to take account partner’s income, but in 2003 this was first relaxed 
and in 2012 removed completely, making it an individual benefit. From 2014 onwards, a person 
receiving unemployment benefits can also top it up with earned income up to 300 euros per 
month, already easing the combination of the benefit and labor market activities. (ibid. 6.) Basic 
social assistance and housing benefits on the other hand are schemes which working-age 
population can apply for separately in addition to unemployment benefits (Halmetoja, De 
Wispelaere & Pulkka 2018, 10).  
Basic income has been a regularly emerging proposal in Finnish discussions from late 1970s or 
early 1980s onwards (Ikkala 2012; Koistinen & Perkiö 2014).  In party politics, the Green League 
(Vihreät) and Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto), and the Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta) have 
been in favor of basic income, although there have been individual supporters in almost all 
parties (Perkiö 2019, 3). The first proposed basic income scheme in Finland dates to 1984 and 
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there have been schemes proposed both by individual academics and societal thinkers and 
political parties from then onwards (Koistinen & Perkiö 2014).  
In the context of 1980s unprecedentedly high unemployment under economic prosperity, basic 
income was discussed as way to tackle unemployment by increasing job sharing and alternatives 
to gainful employment, such as civil society work (Koistinen & Perkiö 2014). The discussion 
also evolved around guaranteed minimum income or citizen’s wage as a social right, and as a 
means for enhancing redistribution and autonomy and reducing poverty (Julkunen 2009 268-
269; Perkiö 2019). The term basic income seems to have first appeared in parliamentary debates 
in 1987, and it crowded out alternative terms in the 1990s context of deep recession. At this 
time, basic income discussion shifted to aims of incentivizing activity, facilitating partial 
employment and enhancing entrepreneurship, while also basic income proponents also 
questioned full employment as a central axis of the society (Perkiö 2019).  
The very first years of the 2000s were very silent in Finland (Perkiö 2019). In 2006-2007, the 
precariat movement of EuroMayDay and The Green League’s (Vihreät) basic income proposal 
in the elections of 2007 brought basic income back to public discussion and to the political 
agenda (Julkunen 2009; Ikkala 2012, 72-73; Perkiö 2019). The precarity movement of 2006 
highlighted basic income as a means to tackle risks associated with “new work” or non-standard 
forms of employment (Julkunen 2009, 271; Perkiö 2019). Echoing widespread discussions on 
needs for systematic reform, the Finnish government in this time established the SATA 
Committee in 2007 with the aim of simplifying the social security to incentivize work, reduce 
poverty and to guarantee social security coverage in all life’s situations. Due to internal 
conflicting views on the direction of the reform, the committee failed to deliver any substantial 
changes to the system. (Ikkala 2012, 75-76.) A national basic income network 
(Perustuloverkosto) was formed in 2011, and in 2013 a citizen’s initiative campaign was held in 
Finland. Although the initiative failed to collect the necessary signatures to continue to the 
parliament, it was featured in the local media (De Wispelaere, Halmetoja & Perkiö 2019.) 
Basic income reappeared to the Finnish parliamentary agenda and public attention big time in 
2015, when the Finnish government then led by the Centre Party announced it was going to run 
a nation-wide basic income experiment. The aims of the experiment were strictly tied to labor 
market activation of unemployed people and in a broader sense to enhancing experimental 
culture in search for best practices (HE 215/2016 vp). Perkiö (2019) describes that basic income 
has been predominantly framed in terms of activity from mid-1990s onwards, but in recent years 
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the debate has concentrated even more narrowly in employment and active job-seeking instead 
of alternative forms of activity.  
The Greens have been advocating for universal basic income ever since they were formed as a 
party in the 1980s (Koistinen & Perkiö 2014). According to Perkiö (2013, 224) especially 
members from a background in the National Coalition and the Centre Party, as well as many of 
the Green League, have denounced they do not support universal basic income which would 
liberate recipients from having to engage in gainful employment. Trade unions have also played 
a considerable role in Finnish politics and they, as well as the Finnish Social Democratic Party 
(Suomen Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue), have formerly rejected various basic income schemes 
as unrealistic or as promoters of neoliberal politics (see Koistinen & Perkiö 2014, 43-49). Like 
in the Spanish leftist sector, the Finnish social democrats have been against basic income due 
to commitment to full employment and social benefits based on work (ibid. 38).  High supports 
for generous social protection have been reported among Finns, but unconditionality seems to 
be the most contested feature of basic income, as it collides with the strong work ethic and fears 
that basic income could lessen work motivation (Andersson & Kangas 2002; Julkunen 2009; 
Ikkala 2012, 78; Koistinen & Perkiö 2014, 39). At the same time, while in most European 
countries mostly minoritarian parties have supported basic income, in Finland also a major 
centrist party has been in favor of the proposal. 
Johanna Perkiö’s (2019) work on basic income framing among Finnish parties and politicians 
come closest to the focus of this thesis. In her study, Perkiö finds that the framing of basic 
income has changed from the 1980s, rights-based framing to a predominantly activation-based 
framing from 1990s onwards. She concludes that Finnish politicians have shared a wide 
consensus over the purpose of basic income both over time as well as party lines. She also 
suggests that the ability of basic income proponents in Finland to adapt to changing political 
climates may be among why the basic income proposal has lived so long in Finland (ibid.).  
  
 
3.3. Summary of Basic Income Discussions in the Case Countries  
 
Based on a review of the general developments in basic income discussion, some overarching 
similarities can be observed across the case countries. In both countries, peaks in basic income 
related discussions have emerged both in times of recessions and economic growth. This is the 
case for the 1980s and 1990s discussions in Finland, and for 2000s and 2010s in both countries. 
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Another aspect concerns the actors who have been active in the basic income discussion. In 
both countries there have been groups of individual academics, advocates and policy-makers 
who have participated in promoting basic income and creating basic income schemes fit to the 
national or regional context. Echoing global tendencies, major socialist or social-democratic 
parties in Spain (PSOE) and in Finland (SDP) have been against basic income due to links to 
the labor movement and centrality of work for their politics (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017, 
189). Local green movement parties in the two countries have been in favor of basic income. 
This also is consistent with the overall image that the global green movement has consistently 
expressed sympathies for basic income, particularly from the perspective of ecological 
constrains for growth and the idea of nature and resources as shared property of humans (ibid. 
197-201). In Finnish politics, also a big centrist party has favored basic income.  
In both contexts, basic income debates have evolved around issues related to work, poverty 
prevention, autonomy and rationalization of the social benefits system. Basic income has been 
discussed in relation to challenges of long-term unemployment in both. In a recent analysis of 
newspaper articles in Finnish, Spanish and Canadian press in 2017, basic income is very strongly 
related to automation and job losses caused by technological advancement, poverty reduction 
and systematic changes needed in the social security system in both Spain and Finland (Perkiö, 
Rincón & van Draanen 2019). This can partly relate to the perceived problem of long-term 
unemployment which has prevailed in these countries both in times of economic prosperity and 
recession (see Sanzo González 2011, 290; Koistinen & Perkiö 2014). It appears that Spanish 
discussions on basic income have highlighted somewhat more poverty and precarious work, 
whereas Finnish discussions from late 1990s onwards have highlighted activity and lately labor 
market activation in a narrower sense. 
Finally, the differences in the landscape of existing basic social benefit schemes in Spain and 
Finland serve as background understanding for the parliamentary debates on basic income. In 
both countries, there have been longstanding appeals for streamlining the social benefits system. 
In Spain, social assistance for those in working age is divided to a two-tire system between the 
state and the autonomous regions, resulting in fragmentation of the features of regional benefits, 
their coverage and duration (Noguera 2018; Sanzo González 2018).  This could strengthen 
justifications for integrating and rationalizing the benefits system at the State level. The existence 
of a labor market subsidy of unlimited duration (and which from 2014 already allows recipients 
to combine it with additional earned income) in Finland, on the other hand, could limit the 
extent to which basic income can be justified as delivering systematic improvements to the 
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current state of affairs, but on the other hand the existent system is already more in line with a 
modest level basic income. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, basic income as a policy proposal has had advocates from 
distinct corners of Europe and the world, and during the last decades it has moved towards 
concrete parliamentary debates in a previously unwitnessed manner. The perspectives of 
domestication and epistemic governance provide theoretical tools to get into grasps with this 
emerging shift from a globally discussed proposal to practical field battles in national 
parliaments over basic income and its purpose. This section discusses the theoretical 
perspectives adopted for the study.  
Chapter 1 set out that that the empirical part of this study examines how parliamentarians 
persuade others about basic income and, in doing so, build certain ways for understanding basic 
income and the situation in hand. Consequently, first central point regarding the theoretical 
starting points is that the study adopts social constructivist perception on knowledge.  Although 
there are differences among different strands of social constructivism, the common feature is 
that social constructivist perspectives question the evident nature of knowledge. Instead, 
knowledge is understood as something that is created in dynamic processes of meaning-making 
and is historically contingent. The knowledge produced has consequences for social action, as 
different constructions support some forms of action rather than others. (Burr 2003, 2–5.) This 
means that when parliamentarians make statements about the current state of affairs and how a 
basic income would play into it, these statements are analyzed perceptions that construct 
particular social realities and exclude other possible ones.  
Chapter 3 already hinted at this direction discussing the perspective according which tendencies 
in national decision-making are largely understood as interdependent, rather than taking largely 
separate, sovereign welfare state ‘containers’ as a starting point. Alasuutari (2016, 4), suggests 
that modern governance is based on a belief that human societies constantly strive for better, 
more affluent or more efficient model of social organization, led by best practices and scientific 
development. Alasuutari (2016, 6) makes the claim that national interest, that which is justified 
as best for ‘us’ and our competitiveness, is not only the obvious starting point in all countries’ 
political discourse but also the “only morally impeccable one” (ibid.) National policy-makers 
 
24 
 
routinely draw on international comparisons and international organizations’ recommendations 
(see Meyer et al. 1997; for case studies see e.g. Alasuutari & Rasimus 2009; Tervonen- Gonçalves 
2012; Rautalin 2018) to gain legitimacy for their proposals, and at the same time, national field 
battles also shape policy proposals, such as basic income, and change global perceptions on the 
proposal and its variants. Local policy-makers play an active role in promoting and ‘packaging’ 
policy proposals in ways which enable people to start viewing them as familiar, domestic and 
particularly designed for the local context (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014b, 9).  
Domestication refers to this process of transformation in which actors seek to “tame” for 
example a new policy proposal, such as basic income, to the local context in a way that it its 
global roots become eventually faded away (ibid.). Alasuutari (2016, 4) argues that this dynamic 
means that actors across the globe react to new policy proposals or catchwords in an increasingly 
synchronized manner, like a ‘flock of fish’, although this does not mean the same as increasing 
convergence among the policy models adopted. The concept of domestication refers to the 
overall taming process, but it does not yet offer tools for analyzing how it happens in practice. 
For this purpose, Alasuutari and Qadir (2014; 2016) offer what they call the epistemic 
governance framework.  
In their perspective on knowledge and governance, the authors draw on Foucauldian 
governmentality studies, developed by authors such as Peter Miller, Nicholas Rose and Mitchell 
Dean. Indeed, when Dean (1998, 91) talks about ‘governing work’ as in how governing is done 
using different techniques, rationalities and forms of knowledge to accomplish “the enfolding 
of authority”, Alasuutari and Qadir use the term epistemic work. By this they (Alasuutari & 
Qadir 2014a; 2016) refer that policy-makers engage in the active work of persuasion in which 
justifications appeal commonly held assumptions about the social world, people’s beliefs, hopes 
and desires. Epistemic governance thus concentrates on the layer of actors’ conceptions of facts 
and themselves, as the threat of military violence or economic intervention are also a means for 
influencing people’s conceptions to push them towards certain actions (Alasuutari & Qadir 
2014a, 71).  
 The persuasion work is based on what the policy-makers themselves believe to be convincing 
to others. In other words, it is premised on their own assumptions about the social world, other 
actors and what is likely to work or not in order to influence others’ reactions and future actions 
as desired. These shared, epistemic assumptions do not only contain knowledge of the values 
and principles which are regarded as virtuous and honorable, but also knowledge of what 
political arguments would be considered inadequate or a strategically unsuccessful in a debate. 
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(Alasuutari 2014, 28.) This take on strategic political persuasion is, of course, far away from 
being unique to Alasuutari & Qadir’s framework, but their take on this epistemic work is that is 
often not strategic but unconscious – policy-makers end up also convincing themselves in the 
process as well (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014a). This would help explaining why, if not just because 
they are superficial ‘hypocrits’ (Meyer 2004) at some point in the domestication process 
politicians themselves become convinced that the policy proposals were result of unique 
national deliberation and suitable for tackling local issues.   
 Alasuutari and Qadir (2014a) suggest that epistemic governance always works around three 
mutually entangled objects of the social world: the ontology of the environment, actors and 
their identifications, and values, norms and moral ideals (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014a). They also 
suggest a division into a paradigmatic dimension and a practical dimension in each of these three 
objects. According to their description, assumptions in the practical dimension are more likely 
to be contested in practical debates, while paradigmatic assumptions often remain uncontested, 
tacit and taken for granted (Alasuutari & Qadir 2014a, 72-74).  They argue that arguments 
normally draw on both dimensions: for example by drawing on a tacit Darwinian idea of 
naturally  evolving societies always on their way towards progress, and scientific knowledge and 
facts to back up how a certain policy would place the country among ‘leaders’ of modernization 
process (ibid.) In distinguishing between these different dimensions of assumptions, the 
epistemic governance perspective is similar to other approaches under what has been called  
discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2011). The difference is that they adopt the term epistemic 
assumptions while other authors often to talk ideas, and instead of talking about different levels 
of ideas, they talk about dimensions of epistemic assumptions. They also do not make the 
distinction between cognitive and normative assumptions or elite or public assumptions, like 
for example Vivien Schmidt (2011) or John Campbell (1998).  This, coupled with the notion 
that Alasuutari and Qadir suggest policy-makers appeal to widely held assumptions in the 
society, indicate that parliamentary justifications in their view open a window to wider public 
assumptions as well.  
The Table 1 below has been formulated for the purpose of this study. It illustrates the three 
objects (environment, actors and values and norms) on the two dimensions (paradigmatic and 
practical dimension) of epistemic work, through empirical examples provided in the text by 
Alasuutari & Qadir (2014a): 
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 The distinction to the three objects of the social world will be adopted for organizing the 
findings of the study. The overall notion of the existence of both more implicit, deep-seated 
assumptions and more vocalized, forefront concepts and catchwords guide the analysis towards 
to pay attention also to what is unquestioned and taken for granted (Schmidt 2010, 7; Alasuutari 
& Qadir 2014a, 77). The analysis in this study will abstain from making an explicit distinction in 
the suggested practical and paradigmatic dimensions. For one, it is not necessarily needed for 
being able to interpret the results, and second, as Vivien Schmidt (2010, 7-8) notes, the same 
concepts can be used to convey different things at different dimensions (or levels) of 
assumptions. The advantage of utilizing the epistemic governance framework in this study, 
instead of some other form of discursive institutionalist approach, is that it connects the 
persuasion work with the perspective of domestication. 
 
 
5. Data and Methods 
 
The following three subsections explain what kind of data parliamentary debates and plenary 
session transcripts are (section 5.1.). The following section 5.2. describes how the documents 
were collected, what was looked for in them and which documents were eventually taken into 
closer analysis (section 5.2.). Finally, section 5.3. discusses discourse analysis and how Fairclough 
Table 1. Objects of epistemic work based on examples provided in Alasuutari & 
Qadir (2014a) 
Objects of epistemic work 
  Ontology of the 
environment 
Actors and 
identifications 
Values and norms 
Paradigmatic 
dimension 
Society as a 
modernization 
project, “evolving” 
through naturalized 
development 
Conceptions of human 
agency: e.g. humans as 
rational, self-interested 
homo economicus. 
Morality based on 
natural rights 
Practical 
dimension 
“evidence-based 
policies”, use of facts 
and measurements  
Appealing to shared 
group interests: e.g. the 
nation as “us” 
“sustainability”, 
“human 
development”, 
“child-centeredness” 
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& Fairclough’s (2012) framework for practical reasoning and the objects of epistemic work were 
utilized in the analysis and to organize the results.  
 
5.1. Parliamentary Debates as Data  
 
Saari ja Kananen (2009, 22) argue that traditionally, social policy research has taken political 
agendas as given consequences of the interplay between different interests and institutions. 
However, studies on domestic debates over new legislation suggest that these national policy 
debates are rarely about realizing a narrowly understood policy proposal in accordance to certain 
policy interests or functional needs of pre-existing institutions. Instead, these debates are more 
about a problem or a new ‘exogenous’ item brought to the national political agenda (Alasuutari 
2013, 29.) As argued in Introduction, studying parliamentary debates on basic income sheds 
light into how local policy-makers come to understand basic income in the process of 
rationalizing it. It is argued that politicians justify their proposals as necessary for securing the 
nation’s interests, which are not adequately met which existent measures, simultaneously 
downplaying narrow individual or group interests (Alasuutari 2015, 88). Pertti Alasuutari (2014, 
28) goes as far as arguing that parliaments are the most important public forums of decision-
making in modern societies, and therefore parliamentary justifications tell us what is considered 
correct or morally acceptable. However, there is no particular need for assuming a priori that 
parliamentary justifications would reflect wider society’s assumptions at large, but politicians’ 
shape how a certain policy becomes understood and contextualized. Parliaments represent a 
forum in which concrete decisions on the future are made, and parliamentarians’ speeches are 
followed by the media and at least parts of the wider public, which makes them a compelling 
subject to study.  
Parliaments can be understood as an institutional forum which sets certain expectations towards 
the communication that takes place in plenary sittings (see Schmidt 2011, 119). When 
parliamentarians enact speeches, criticize the government or pose questions in a plenary session, 
they engage in the global acts of legislating and governing a country (van Dijk 2004, 356). 
Regardless of the country in case, parliamentarians in plenary sittings engage in these global 
actions such as representing their constituents, engaging in opposition, or implementing party 
programs (van Dijk 2004, 356).  The codes of conduct in parliamentary talk strike as similar 
around the world, as well. Parliamentarians assume a similar polite and formal ways of talking 
even when they often disagree on proper policies as they represent different parties, ideologies 
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and social groups (Alasuutari 2016, 87). Parliamentary speeches are also generally prepared 
beforehand, and the speakers know that they are being recorded and documented in public 
plenary session diaries, which are accessible for the wider public. Because of this work of 
preparation and because parliamentarians acknowledge the public nature of their speeches, they 
can be understood as strategic and testimonial. However, there are also more spontaneous 
comments made in plenary sessions, from interruptive shout-outs to comments thought out 
during the time it takes for the Chairperson to give a parliamentarian their turn to talk.  
Chapter 2 already touched upon the argument that appeals for basic income happen in specific 
sociocultural and institutional contexts. These constitute part of the background assumptions 
against which arguments are made. In the context of this study, institutional settings are not 
viewed as ‘objective’ incentive structure for actors but rather as the meaning context in which 
justifications appear reasonable (Schmidt 2011, 119). To be able to interpret the results of this 
study, it is necessary to have at least an overarching idea of the cultural and institutional 
landscape of the case countries, because local parliamentarians are likely to assume that their 
audience is already familiar with many aspects of it. For one, parliamentarians may explicitly 
utilize certain aspects of these to make their case. But more importantly, they may assume some 
aspects of the existent system are so obvious that these are not spelled out (Alasuutari & Qadir 
2016). Although the local politicians may be confident in that their intended audiences may 
understand what is left unsaid, the researcher should have enough background information in 
order to interpret these silences correctly in relation to the sociocultural and institutional 
contexts in which they appear.  
 
5.2. Collection and Description of the Data 
 
The Introduction outlined that this study will be asking first, how politicians in Finnish and 
Spanish parliaments justify basic income and to what extent these justifications bare similarities 
and second, how is the purpose of basic income understood in these debates. Publicly available 
plenary sitting transcriptions of the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta, riksdagen) and the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) were used as data for this purpose. The 
Finnish parliament is a unicameral parliament of 200 Members of Parliament and the Spanish 
parliament is a bicameral parliament consisting of the Congress of Deputies (350 members) and 
the Senate. In the case of the Spanish parliament, the Congress of Deputies corresponds to the 
Finnish Parliament and was used as the site for collecting the data. 
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First, all of the plenary sittings of Spain and Finland in which basic income was mentioned at 
least once were collected from January 2004 to the end of December 2017 – the present moment 
at the time. The time window was chosen based on previous literature (Raventós 2012; 
Koistinen & Perkiö 2014; De Wispelaere 2015) which suggested that basic income discussions 
were actively debated in the political sphere in these two countries roughly from 2005 onwards, 
and again after the financial crisis of 2008 especially from 2013 onwards. Other wordings for 
basic income, such as citizen’s wage (kansalaispalkka), citizen’s income (kansalaistulo, renta 
básica de ciudadanía) and unconditional basic income (vastikkeeton perustulo, renta básica 
incondicional), were also looked for in the collection process. In the Spanish context, universal 
basic income was often referred to as unconditional basic income or citizen’s basic income 
(renta básica incondicional, renta básica de ciudadanía), whereas in Finland the term basic 
income (perustulo) was the most common term to capture the intended concept.  
In the process of recollecting all plenary sitting documents from 2004 to 2017, all mentions of 
basic income were revised and all those that did not refer to universal basic income schemes 
but something different were excluded from the data for subsequent analysis.  These removed 
mentions included general notions that people should have some basic level income floor or 
mentions containing the term basic income but which in fact referred to other benefit programs. 
In Spanish debates, the term basic income (renta básica) was also used when referred to different 
autonomous communities’ minimum income programs and other benefits programs in place, 
such as regional minimum income insertion schemes (rentas mínimas de inserción), basic 
income for emancipation (renta básica de emancipación) and guaranteed citizen’s income (renta 
garantizada de ciudadanía). In some autonomous communities, such as Navarra and Andalucía, 
basic income (renta básica) is the name used of targeted minimum-income programs. In the 
Finnish documents, the term perustulo meant most of the time universal basic income, although 
there were some occasions in which the term was used to refer broadly to minimum income 
floor or minimum-income schemes in general.  
After this, two periods in which there was a larger amount of basic income mentions in Finnish 
and Spanish national parliaments were scouted out from the data selection. Based on the amount 
of mentions, the data set was further concentrated to the peak periods of 2005–2007 and 2015–
2017. The only exceptional year within this data set is 2015, when there was a strong peak in the 
discussion in Finland but no mentions of basic income at all in Spain. After careful 
consideration, this year was decided to be kept within the data set. The year 2015 was a key in 
the Finnish parliamentary debate, as the politicians at the time were discussing the national basic 
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income experiment. On the other hand, this made it possible to see whether the parliamentary 
debate sparked in Finland in 2015 had repercussions in the following years’ basic income 
mentions by their Spanish colleagues.  
The total number of plenary sitting documents containing at least one mention of basic income 
over the selected years and included for the closer analysis was N = 104. The average length of 
the plenary sitting records was 84 pages, the shortest document being 10 pages and the longest 
215 pages. In majority of these documents, however, basic income was only mentioned in one 
or a couple more individual statements. In 37 plenary session records, which comprises roughly 
one third of the data, basic income was mentioned only once. These debates ranged from 
general social spending and budget debates to student fees and allowances, disability pensions, 
unemployment benefits, housing allowances; discussions around the aging population and the 
future of automation, critiques of austerity measures taken under the financial crisis and so on. 
Overwhelmingly, these mentions appeared in debates touching upon social policy, employment 
policies, and the future tendencies of work, public spending and future demographic tendencies.  
The most mentions were made in those sittings in which bills on basic income were debated: 
October 2nd, 2007 in Spain (71 mentions) and October 25th, 2016 in Finland (246 mentions). 
These three proposals were also read through in order to understand the context of these 
debates, namely two bills for instituting a committee to research basic income in Spain 
(ES_14.4.2005 and ES_20.5.2005) and the Finnish government’s bill for basic income 
experiment (HE 215/2016 vp). In these sessions, also negative postures towards basic income 
were clearly voiced and this largely explains the rise in amount of mentions during the period. 
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Table 2. Number of plenary sitting documents containing one or more mentions of 
basic income by country and year 
 Finland Spain 
 Number of 
documents 
Number of 
mentions 
Number of 
documents 
Number of 
mentions 
2005 7 22 5 26 
2006 7 13 2 2 
2007 6 24 1 71 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
2015 22 149 0 0 
2016 30 551 2 2 
2017 17 78 5 24 
     
Total 89 837 15 125 
 
Table 2 shows that during the observed years, basic income was mentioned in a total of 89 
plenary sittings, while in Spain it was brought up in 15 plenary sittings. Basic income is 
mentioned in almost six times more plenary sessions in Finland and the large difference between 
the countries appear particularly in the period of 2015 to 2017. The growth in mentions in this 
latter period in Finland is explained by the announcement and debates regarding the Finnish 
basic income experiment from 2015 onwards. Basic income was intensively mentioned during 
the years 2015 and 2016, when the parliament discussed the legislative bill, the design and goals 
of the experiment. The following subsection will address discourse analytical perspectives, 
Fairclough & Fairclough’s (2012) framework for practical reasoning and how it was used 
together with the epistemic governance perspective in the process of coding the data and 
organizing the results. 
 
5.3. Discourse Analysis  
 
Language is central to this process of meaning-making and it shapes the ways in which the social 
world becomes understandable to humans (Burr 2003, 8). Discourse analytical approaches strive 
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to search systems of meaning which are hidden in communication and interaction and often 
taken as granted (Remes 2006, 296). From a discourse analytical perspective, language is not 
taken simply as a device used to merely describe reality. Instead, it is argued that language and 
discourses play an active role in constituting, challenging and reshaping realities. Instead of a 
clear-cut research method, discourse analysis can be better described as a relatively flexible 
theoretical framework, in which it is possible to distinguish different orientations which vary in 
their philosophy of science (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1993, 17). In this sense, it is more 
helpful to understand discourse analysis as quite broad family of more particular approaches 
rather than any singular approach.  
While there are considerable differences between different discourse analytical approaches, they 
share the understanding of language and culture as systems within which actors create meanings. 
Discourse theoretical approaches, then, are interested in how language and culture shape and 
(re)produce social world. It is also assumed that multiple parallel and competing systems of 
meaning exist at the same time (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1993, 17-18). This means that even 
in a one speech (as an example) there are typically elements from different discourses present. 
Discourses also limit understandings of social phenomena, actors and objects, as they depict 
particular images of the social world, while excluding others (Remes 2006, 332-333). This is not 
to say that matter would not exist independent from the understandings that humans construct 
about them, but as Torfing (2005, 18) puts it, “matter does not carry the means of its own 
representation”. It is this layer of meanings and representations that discourse analytical 
approaches are interested in.  
Fairclough & Fairclough’s (2012) discourse analytical framework for practical reasoning was 
adopted for the analysis to scout out goals to which basic income was linked to in 
parliamentarians’ arguments. The authors suggest making an analytical division in arguments 
between claims (what ought to be done), circumstances (the natural, social and institutional 
context of action), means and goals (future, possible state of affairs). Fairclough and Fairclough 
(2012, 44) suggest a structure of practical reasoning in which 
“the hypothesis [is] that action A might enable the agent to reach his goals (G), starting from 
his circumstances (C), and in accordance with certain values (V), leads to the presumptive 
claim that he ought to do A. “ 
 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, 44) continue saying that often in practice the context of action 
is perceived as a problem, to which the action is seen as a solution for. As an example, the 
argument that “basic income would reduce poverty” entails that if basic income was 
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implemented (action), it would help tackling poverty (a goal informed by values). The empirical 
work with the texts started with importing all documents to the Atlas.ti program. All claims 
related to basic income were marked, initially both the positive and the negative ones. In case 
the speaker was referring to previous statements in the sessions, those were also marked as the 
context in which basic income was brought in. The reading led towards concentrating more on 
basic income proponents for the simple reason that they spoke more about it. Those favoring 
basic income had to work harder to convince others as they were bearing the “burden of proof” 
against the backdrop of existent social benefits schemes and more conventional measures to 
renovate the system.  There seemed to be more analytical unity in arguments in favor of basic 
income, while opposing arguments were often simply stating that basic income is utopian, would 
be impossible to finance or that it would have perverse consequences particularly for the 
valorization of gainful employment.  
After marking the basic income related claims, these were printed out of the Atlas.ti -program. 
The claims were read alongside with the plenary sitting transcriptions of each corresponding 
claim to keep in mind the conversational context of these. Specific goals linked to basic income 
were looked for in the text and themes related to the goals, such as poverty, inclusion, 
unemployment, administration, broadening the concept of work were identified in the process. 
The aim of the process was to move inductively from specific goals towards unifying 
overarching goals (the purpose) of basic income. This in mind, attention was paid also to the 
objects of epistemic work in the process, asking to what kinds of understandings about values, 
social environment and actors these goals were related to in discourse. The analysis was aimed 
at scouting out the similarities between in basic income justifications between the two national 
parliaments. However, in the process of the analysis it became clear that there was a distinct 
predominant discourse in favor of basic income in the two parliaments. The final results were 
narrowed to three discourses in favor of basic income, one shared between the case countries 
and two that pro-basic income discourses particular to either Spain or Finland. 
 
6. Results  
 
The research questions for the case study concerned how basic income is justified in the two 
parliaments and how the purpose of basic income is understood in these debates. The results in 
the following subsections discuss the found basic income discourses: fixing the safety net 
(section 6.1.), enhancing activity (section 6.2.) and emancipation (section 6.3.). Each subsection 
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discusses how these were connected to particular understandings about the environment, actors, 
values and norms. These do not represent all basic income discourses found in the data but only 
the three most central ones. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the Spanish parliament there were two basic income bills 
presented, one in 2005 and one in 2007. The two legislative bills and the two proposals for 
starting a basic income committee are remarkably similar and even share identical parts. Both 
proposals highlight poverty, precarity of work and situations of family dependency as the main 
problems to tackle with introducing a basic income. They also argue strongly for the need to 
broaden the conception of ‘work’ from gainful employment towards recognizing the social value 
of care work and voluntary work (ES_14.4.2005; ES_20.5.2005). Between 2005 and 2007, basic 
income was maintained in the plenary sessions through individual mentions by members of the 
advocating parties. The second time after 2005 when a larger debate takes place in Spain is in 
2007, when the two proposals for establishing a committee for studying basic income’s viability 
is discussed in the parliament (ES_2.10.2007). National poverty rates and situations of family 
dependency remain focal points of the debate, which is strongly divided into those advocating 
basic income and those opposing it. The opponents point towards the impossibility of financing 
basic income and oppose the idea of giving a ‘free pay’ for everyone regardless of their work 
contribution, other sources of income or their life situation.  
In the same period of 2005-2007 in the Finnish parliament, basic income was discussed as a way 
to tackle unemployment and perceived problems related to non-standard forms of employment, 
but also to extend social security for groups such as freelancers, small entrepreneurs, and 
students. The question of work precarity featured in the discussion as well. The Greens had 
included basic income to their electoral program of 2007. This provoked discussion around 
basic income also from those opposing the proposal, and the Greens were criticized in the 
plenary session for populist politics as basic income did not make it to the program of the 
Government in which Greens were part of.  
In the latter period of 2015-2017, basic income was mentioned in the Spanish parliament related 
to Podemos’ 2014 Euro election proposal. Podemos party members themselves were 
remarkably quiet about basic income as such in the national parliament, although they suggested 
gradual improvements to the existent minimum income scheme (which, particularly by those 
opposing their standpoints was connected to Podemos’ previous basic income agenda). Basic 
income was also mentioned arguing that Finland was already on the way to implement the 
proposal, pointing to the Finnish basic income experiment. 
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In this time, Finnish debate on basic income was narrowed more down to whether basic income 
could improve work incentives and unemployment, rather than other forms of activity. Finnish 
discussions evolved around the technical and legal aspects of the planned national basic income 
experiment, as well as the positive international attention it was already attracting. Importantly 
for this analysis, these debates also involved struggles over the purpose of basic income. 
Particularly some Left Alliance and Green League members challenged the purpose of basic 
income understood narrowly as a measure for labor market activation. However, there was a 
wide consensus among the parliamentarians that basic income would constitute a positive way 
of activating citizens compared to strict activation measures. 
In one third of the plenary sessions, basic income was mentioned once in the overall day’s 
discussion. In these instances, it was brought up in anecdotally in debates on other policy 
proposals and it was almost exclusively done in a positive tone, as to remind other politicians 
that basic income could be an alternative way of addressing the case at hand. These mentions 
can be read as a strategic for mainstreaming the basic income proposal. The individual mentions 
were brought up in a way that did not tend to sidetrack the overall agenda of the day and with 
few exceptions and were also left without contestation.   
In the next sections, the three main discourses found in the debates are described in more detail. 
The citations are selected as representing typical or illustrative examples of each discourse. Basic 
income was discussed in the plenary sessions related to perceived problems with of the existent 
social security system, changes in the labor market, and citizens’ needs and rights. All 
justifications were done in relation to these broader understandings, whether basic income was 
discussed more as a pragmatic tweak to the existent system or as an ambitious or more radical 
program for change. In the end of the analysis there will be a summary of the main 
commonalities and differences between the basic income discourse in Finland and Spain. 
 
6.1. Fixing the Safety Net   
 
When basic income is justified by pointing out systematic failures of the safety net and how 
basic income would address them better, it is done against the unquestioned assumption that 
welfare states hold a normative responsibility towards citizen’s basic needs and subsistence. This 
assumption is no different from those stressing any other social security reform, as addressing 
poverty and social exclusion, to increase income security and stability are widely perceived as 
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preconditions for a functional society and market. Against this background, basic income is 
justified as a holistic reform for problems arising from the system per se, and current changes 
in larger transnational environment, on the other. 
Appealing to groups of potential basic income beneficiaries within the safety net discourse is 
typically done by highlighting the stress and suffering the existent system causes to those who 
need to navigate the complex system of benefits. Justifications also highlight that situations of 
economic distress are not people’s own fault but caused by factors that are out of their control 
and evoke images of certain groups of people who are deemed as in particularly in need for cash 
transfers. These are intimately related in discourse and will be discussed along the analysis. These 
assumptions are also closely entwined to the activity discourse and the emancipation discourse. 
Tackling safety net issues and particularly how they are perceived to influence particular groups, 
however, is the baseline of basic income justifications in the overall data. As such, this section 
serves as a a primer for the next two subsections.  
In both Finnish and Spanish context, basic income is justified as a measure which would 
contribute to fixing failures of the existent social assistance systems. The safety net appears in 
this discourse as a deep-seated metaphor. Images of the safety net (whether it is a messy 
patchwork of benefit programs or a coherent net without apparent holes) essentially serve to 
assess how well the nation is performing in terms of providing coverage against poverty and 
social exclusion, deemed as important risks to be remedied. The common rationale appealed to 
is the need for a systemic, rather than set of smaller partial reforms, which basic income, it is 
argued, could bring about. Finnish and Spanish alike appeal to the understanding that failures 
in the existent system have been recognized by policy-makers during past times, but these 
policies have only served as incomplete quick-fixes:  
The measures you have taken […] are nothing but patches that ask for lots of requirements 
and their duration is short-term. They are patches which only function to stigmatize poverty. 
[…]. Just a while ago we presented an initiative to push forward a minimum income 
guarantee as the first step towards a basic income. Our group understands that this is one 
of the most central problems of our country […] (ES_28.9.2017) 
At some point we must remake a synthesis of our social security system, because this kind 
of patching up has truly created a situation in which it is possible to fall through the basic 
security net to the cold asphalt. Now that we discuss this basic income security experiment 
and basic income thinking, […] one [of the aims] is to patch up the social security system. 
(FI_10.3.2005) 
The idea of the social security system as a mismatched combination of past policies implement 
to solve problems “here and now” are vitalized in this manner especially in the Finnish context, 
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in which the social security system is often referred to as a ‘patchwork quilt’ or a messy ‘straw 
mobile’ (FI_20.6.2017) of different targeted programs. The upshot of the safety net is that at its 
current state, “no one manages its big picture” (FI_206.2017). Spanish basic income 
proponents, too, stress the level of fragmentation and overt bureaucracy of the system and how 
it leads to inefficiencies and distress for the beneficiaries: 
Today the citizen does not know what rights he has got, which protection he can access in 
the case of problems nor which requisites are those that he has to fulfill for them and, when 
he does know, he is absorbed in a series of problematizations and situations that surely have 
made him loose a precious amount of time and above all, get burned out in the search of 
benefits and solutions, which is not precisely where he should be putting his energy and his 
effort. (ES_19.5.2005)  
The underlying perception across the data is that the social security system is a product of a 
mismatch of different policies gradually implement one after another in search of rather short-
term solutions to quickly solve the gaps identified in each moment: 
A couple of comments to this basic income issue and from the perspective of an 
unemployed person to the situation in which we overall are now. Indeed, we have all, as 
parties, been responsible for [the fact] that throughout the last years and decades we have 
created this […] perpetual motion machine in a way […] you know that moving a bit one 
block causes problems elsewhere. (FI_20.9.2016)  
It is necessary to rethink the social welfare state, and a key instrument for that can be basic 
income […]. Today our system [...] is a total disorder of social benefits and other economic 
remedies which reclaim a great level of cohesion and integration […]. 33 types of benefits, 
every one of them with their criteria and requirements, with their systems of adjunction and 
monitoring, with an army – excuse me for saying it – of people who need to be dedicated 
not towards giving this social wellbeing but towards even controlling these benefits. 
(ES_2.10.2007) 
In the last citation, the distress caused by the existent system to applicants is perceived to be 
caused by this lack of control over one’s subsistence. In many instances, this was coupled with 
a normative objection towards the idea that it is other actors, such as the bureaucrats, that 
exercise control over who gets what. In general, all decision-makers striving to push forwards a 
social security reform would call upon gaps in the existent system, but those arguing for basic 
income particularly stress how improvements which do not address the problematic system as 
a whole would fall short from the perks of a basic income scheme. Basic income is posed as a 
cohesive reform for the long term, and in this sense better than its competitors. 
The assumed recipients lack control over their vulnerable situations insofar the problems are 
successfully argued as systematic and dependent on past decision-making. In the Spanish 
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context, throughout the analyzed documents, these groups most often evoked are the poor, 
women and the ‘precariat’, regarded as particularly in need for assistance:  
Especially, [universal basic income] would affect in a beneficial way to women and the youth, 
the great victims of precarious work and therefore of family dependency (ES_2.10.2007) 
Citizen’s basic income […] will always be above the poverty line and its principles will be to 
end with poverty, to avoid stigmatization of that part of the population which has to 
demonstrate its incapability to obtain resources in order to access a particular subsidy, and 
to increase the level of autonomy […]” (ES_20.5.2005) 
Finnish politicians particularly appealed to those working in non-standard form employment, 
self-employment or gig jobs, but also groups such students and single parents, before the basic 
income experiment which narrowed discussion more towards the unemployed population. In 
occasions, these groups were used to evoke story lines of struggles under the current system:  
The Greens have proposed a basic income model which would replace all current minimum 
benefits […]. Nowadays the situation is that if one gets unemployment benefit, one may be 
in a situation in which it is not worth it to take upon a random, short gig job, because it can 
drop the person and her family outside from social benefits. And that is of course a difficult 
situation for example in a case in which, let’s say, one is a single parent of three children, 
who must carry the responsibility for being able to buy porridge to the table the following 
week. (FI_9.5.2015)  
 
When the parliamentarians evoke a story of a social benefit receiver type, it serves the purpose 
of invigorating the issue at hand, and often to emphasize with this people’s struggle – therefore, 
the neediness – and to downplay individual control. These are types of reasonings that influence 
people’s evaluations of the situation and the ‘deservingness’ of different groups (cf. Laenen, 
Rossetti & van Oorschot 2019). Highlighting these groups can be regarded as a manner to work 
around the objection based on the norm of reciprocity (Chapter 2.2.). If there are good reasons 
to believe that some adults in principle capable of work are unable to participate in the 
cooperation even if they were willing to, this can make them seem more entitled to assistance. 
This is the case made when appealed to general changes in the labor market (such as increase in 
non-standard forms of employment) which is argued to make subsistence through employment 
increasingly difficult above personal control over the situation. On the other hand, justifications 
highlight groups of adult citizens in principle capable of working but who can be perceived to 
have other duties deemed reasonable: students can be are expected to be able to study instead 
of providing for themselves full time, or parents are expected to care for their children which 
restricts availability to work.  
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Thus, when basic income proponents call upon groups identified as beneficiaries, they are often 
those already at least to some extend recognized as ‘deserving’ by existent benefits systems 
targeted towards families, the youth and those in poverty. Appealing to these group 
identifications already coded in existent benefits systems can be argued to be particularly 
powerful, as actors do not often consider the discursive layer of highly institutionalized practices 
such as those of law (Schmid 2011). While basic income would in these arguments enhance the 
autonomy of, say, the poor, it also reinforces the category and targets basic income to those 
deemed vulnerable. On the other hand, the group identities evoked are not restricted only to 
those conventionally granted with targeted benefits. Especially in the Finnish parliament basic 
income is justified as a potential interest of any given individual, as it is argued that the future is 
unknown and that in some point or another, anyone could in principle be in need of a basic 
income, when shifting from employment to studies or parental leave or when there are gaps 
between short-term jobs. 
In both parliaments, justifications for basic income relate to fixing gaps in the safety net, but 
there are differences in the goals. Spanish justifications, the concrete goal related to a basic 
income reform relates more concretely to extending the safety net, whereas in Finnish 
justifications the emphasis is more on increasing its flexibility. In both parliaments, these 
speakers share an understanding that population’s needs have and will continue to disperse due 
to inevitable global changes such as increasing automation and general change of work relations.  
Finnish parliamentarians address this dispersion mostly in a positive tone, while in the Spanish 
discussion these changes were addressed more from the perspective of the threats these changes 
could bring about unless actions are taken. All parliamentarians argue that the vast number of 
rigid categorizations for distinct benefits and groups of people is the main complication of the 
safety net. Positive statements towards basic income in Finnish justifications is connected to the 
catchword of “streamlining” the system (FI_25.10.2016), although the idea of basic income as 
way to simplify the multitude of existent benefits programs is broadly captured in Spanish 
parliamentarians’ justifications as well. The old system with its categorizations in Finnish 
justifications is perceived as outdated because of the diversification of life paths of individuals: 
 […] the basic idea in basic income is precisely not [for it] to be directed to the unemployed 
or to some other group but to look above these categories generated by modern industrial 
societies, look towards a time in which we no longer have a separate, different category an 
“unemployed”, but instead we have people whose administrative status is changing so fast 
that these categorizations make no sense. (FI_25.10.2016)  
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Soon we will even be talking about shredded life, in which people are simultaneously in an 
employment relationship, as entrepreneurs, studying a new profession, on a parental leave 
and the next year on a rehabilitation assistance, on a part-time pension and as caregivers. No 
social security system can keep up with this kind of shredded life, and that is why the 
government’s basic income experiment is so welcome. […] (FI_9.12.2015)  
 
Basic income is argued to meet citizen’s needs beyond a world of old categorizations that no 
longer matches with the changed reality, and basic income reform points towards a symbolic 
departure from static categorizations of a ‘modern industrial society’ towards more dynamic 
times. The life has shattered as if a consequence of these inevitable changes, it is argued, basic 
income would buffer the ups and downs along one’s life cycle, and in the society at large. Spanish 
parliamentarians in favor of basic income emphasize this question more from the angle of the 
perceived human costs caused by situations of poverty and personal distress under the existent 
circumstances, but similarly argue that basic income would lead to greater autonomy and 
alleviate these vulnerable situations.   
In sum, the bases for justifying basic income within the safety net discourse are in pointing 
towards systemic failures such as gaps, complicatedness, rigid categorizations, and the safety net 
as a result of layered policy decisions in the past. The social security system needs to change, it 
is argued, because the social environment and future landscapes have become more disperse. 
As such, basic income is perceived to ensure citizen’s capabilities in their different points in life 
(Finland), and to combat poverty and to increase autonomy (Spain). Parliamentarians across the 
data tend to downplay the control of benefit receivers and take as a self-evident assumption that 
all members of the society should be granted with means for managing through economic 
distress. In positive statements towards basic income, fixing the old safety net and providing 
subsistence and allowing for degree of autonomy to those in need are valued as desirable and 
necessary.  
 
6.2. Encouraging Activity  
 
Basic income as a tool for activation is a particular feature of the Finnish debates, which does 
not appear in Spanish parliamentarians’ justifications for basic income. Within the activation 
discourse, humans are perceived as naturally striving to be productive. The purpose of basic 
income against this assumption is to abolish traps created by the ‘passivating’ social security 
system, consequently enabling people to express their active nature and life’s preferences. Basic 
income is opposed with ‘harsh’ activation policies: 
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Basic income enables the individual with more freedom of choice and power over one’s own 
business. It incentivizes to work and makes adaptation to different life situations and moves 
between them easier for the individual. The basic income experiment starting in the 
beginning of next year has assumedly the task of demonstrating the value of basic income 
as an enabler of life paths of active persons and as a securer in the kinds of changes that 
may come up. Instead of control, the key position is given to positive future belief and trust 
in individuals. (25.10.2016)  
 
However, basic income in Finnish discussions is overall linked to the activation discourse by 
arguing it would decrease incentive traps and bureaucratic traps which are seen a central 
problem of the social security system by virtually all members of parliament: 
[…] the current social security system […] creates an obstacle for becoming employed, 
income [traps] and incentive traps are created. […] Although in the governmental program 
there is no talk about basic income, which is the Greens long-term goal, there are certain 
features in this item that give belief in that it would be possible to become, broadly in the 
Finnish society, convinced that exactly this kind of direction is right and decisive steps 
should be taken towards it.  (FI_24.4.2007) 
 
In Finnish debates, both basic income proponents and those challenging the idea often share a 
common understanding that unemployment is the most stressing problem of the society to be 
solved, and that the existent social security system is not making it possible but rather incentives 
passivity. Basic income, it is argued, would be more considerate towards different life paths. 
There is however the assumption that individuals will, once enabled with a greater autonomy to 
choose their paths, engage in productive activities. When Finnish politicians make a case for 
basic income within the activity discourse, they work around the reciprocity norm, arguing that 
individuals want to get active and be productive. Instead of external control, it is argued, basic 
income would be based on a “positive trust” towards the citizens for them to use their freedom 
responsibly. According to this line, it is systematically claimed that “basic income incentivizes 
work and hiring” (FI_14.12.2016), “makes work always worthwhile” (FI_8.11.2016) and people 
are strongly willing to work in gainful employment. Basic income then becomes discussed in 
relation to assumedly able-bodied unemployed adults and their willingness to work:  
Another difference between representative Lahtela and me regards how we understand the 
willingness of the unemployed to work. Representative Lahtela saw that the unemployed 
searches in all ways the possibility of not to work. Now for example according to the studies 
of the Academy [of Finland] people are ready to work and are precisely even ready to do 
work that doesn’t match their education. But there has to be some benefit to that. My 
starting point is that people want to do work and that they truly are ready to do so.” 
(FI_10.3.2005)  
The understanding is that the current social security system creates traps which passivate the 
recipients, and adjusting the criteria, amount and timing of social transfers is the most effective 
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tool to motivate citizens towards choosing work. The change of work is placed as an active 
force, out of straight political deliberation, requiring renovations of the social security system 
and taxation. This change also requires an inquiry over the basis of financing the welfare society 
and forms of carrying those who need help through transforming the social security system that 
“should be rather an activating trampoline than a passivating security net” (FI_20.6.2017), 
bouncing one off from the foundational floor straight back to employment. 
 In principle it is argued that individuals would be able to live their lives a bit more according to 
their own desires and definitions good life with a basic income, but in fact the activation 
discourse calls individuals to subject positions defined by their desire and willingness to be 
productive. Justifications for basic income therefore shift focus from past to future reciprocity, 
while the norm of reciprocity in itself is highly expected to be complied with by individuals. The 
idea of progress here stressed enhancing future economic growth through granting a basic 
income as a form of social investment which would then return to the society as growth, but 
also as general wellbeing. Basic income is argued as giving “a better basis for developing oneself” 
(FI_20.6.2017).  
There are two overlapping assumptions about the future returns of basic income within the 
activity discourse which change slightly over the observed time. During the first period of 2005-
2007, basic income was justified more along with appeals to broaden the general conception of 
what is socially useful work. In this period, positive statements towards the expected effects of 
basic income would also consider that citizens would perhaps like to spend more time on care 
work or enhancing their education, rather than strictly focusing on gainful employment. 
Although basic income justifications did often embrace activity through a broader 
understanding of work, the focal point of the 2015-2017 discussions in Finland evolved more 
strongly around activity as labor market activation. This is largely explained by the fact that the 
2015-2017 debates in Finland evolved around the basic income experiment, in which the 
political and scientific agenda was set up to test whether the incentives of a guaranteed basic 
income would change the way long-term unemployed Finns behave: 
The aim […] is to examine what kinds of effects a basic income, paid without means-testing, 
has on labor market behavior and participation of persons who at the starting situation are 
unemployed, receiving labor market subsidy or basic unemployment benefit (HE 215/2016)
   
The agenda set by the governmental bill framed the discussion towards whether basic income 
would be suitable in this sense of enhancing labor market activity, which guided justifications 
towards the activity dimension in general and more particularly towards the effects on 
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employment against other types of productive activities. The value of basic income became 
framed strictly in terms of the labor market activation effects which, in turn, created a struggle 
over the meaning and aims of a basic income, as its possibilities had been understood in a 
broader manner by many basic income proponents: 
Well, why is this case [of the experiment] not about basic income? Basic income, although 
an abstract of a concept, [it] is not a mindless concept, it is not a concept that means 
completely whatever, but during the basic income discussion over the last decades, certain 
characteristics have become standards of it […] Concentrating the experiment to a certain 
administrative category is more like looking backwards than forwards, rather part of the old 
system than that which has been conceived as typical of a basic income in the basic income 
discussion. (FI_25.10.2016) 
 
In the Finnish 2015-2017 discussions, basic income was overwhelmingly discussed as a means 
for activating recipients; celebrating activity and debating on whether or not basic income would 
increase the level of employment and, thus, secure economic growth and the future maintenance 
of the welfare state. Increasingly many parliamentarians in this period joined the canon of saying 
that basic income would ‘create employment’, ‘make work always attractive’ and signify ‘positive 
belief in the individuals’ – carrot, instead of stick, for the unemployed, it was said. The 
underlying assumption in these debates was also that unemployment can be addressed through 
provoking changes in the supply-side factors.  It is noteworthy that by these most recent debates, 
basic income seemed to have gained a positive connotation among increasingly many MPs, 
despite the opposition repeatedly questioning what the government actually understood as basic 
income:  
Maybe the name [of a ‘basic income’ experiment] does not necessarily fit in place, but it 
nevertheless tells that there is a positive attitude taken, and it is maybe a little, I would still 
say, kinder to those people who are in the realm of this experiment, than if we talked about 
this incentive experiment or about how could we now get those long-term unemployed to 
that working life, because it has also been brought up how we talk about people and whether 
it is respectful or not. (FI_25.10.2016) 
I wish that we will get that kind of a positive vibe from this experiment to this issue now 
[…] (FI_25.10.2016)  
 
Changes in the environment are perceived mainly as something exterior to political decision-
making. What is left for political decision-making is trying to adjust to these changes by 
enhancing labor market activation and flexibility. Here, the evolvement of the society is taken 
as a value per se: any steps are good, no matter the direction. The social security system is 
perceived to need ‘norm dismantlement’ (FI_6.9.2016).  
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 This basic income experiment […] is a start or a bridge towards the evolving social security 
of the decade of 2020, which takes into account better chopped up jobs (“silpputyö”) and 
that today and in the future a person needs increasingly many sources of income to gather 
up one’s overall income. (FI_25.10.2016)  
 
The activation discourse emphasizes that individuals’ actions are first and foremost motivated 
by economic incentives or the lack of them. If monetary incentives become the perceived as the 
main motivator of the level and quality of one’s activity, similar effects could arguably be reached 
also by restricting the amount or conditions for basic allowances. The valuable activity and 
means of activation were understood in very different ways by different actors, as outlined here: 
Also, I cannot understand that the same government that tries out basic income, which to 
my mind is a positive thing, has not agreed to take into this law proposal [of the activation 
model] an article which would guarantee that a broader definition would be given to activity 
in a way, so that [in situations] when no job vacancies exist, the unemployed could guarantee 
the maintaining of his unemployment benefit via showing activity in other ways, for example 
in voluntary work or in some NGO work, which would sustain his wellbeing and 
participation in the society. (FI_8.12.2017)  
 
Although the parliamentarian in the citation above indicate a seeming paradox between the 
governments’ strict activation scheme on the one hand, and an unconditional basic income, on 
the discursive side these both schemes were rationalized according to same ideas about 
activation and that individuals primarily choose to work or not based on rational economic 
calculations or lack of subsistence.  
In sum, the activation discourse appeals to an idea that individuals are naturally active, and they 
find their sense of value in actively engaging in an active lifestyle and work opportunities, 
particularly if incentivized through monetary rewards. Passivity is perceived as a state of affairs 
forced by the existent social security system, not principally the fault of the individuals. The 
social security system is perceived to create traps and inefficiencies, which need to be reformed 
towards a more flexible and work-incentivizing system. Those against basic income argued that 
basic income would even further disincentivize work, encourage passivity and increase the 
problem of free-riding of those who do cannot be trusted to embrace the ideal of active 
citizenship. The parliamentarians favoring basic income, on the other hand, do not question the 
values of activation or the principle of contribution. Instead, they stress that a guaranteed basic 
income would be the way to remove reinforced obstacles from the individuals’ way so that they 
can support themselves and fulfill their lives with more meaning via employment, small 
entrepreneurship, freelancing, and other types of jobs. 
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6.3. Emancipation of popular classes  
 
While goals such as increasing individual autonomy, dignity, right to subsistence and questions 
of fairness and justice feature in justifications for basic income in both parliaments, the 
predominant basic income discourse in Spanish debates stands in clear distinction to the 
dominant activity discourse in Finland. Within the emancipation discourse, the society is 
perceived through the imagery of a constant struggle between the powerholders and what the 
parliamentarians call workers or the ‘popular classes’. Basic income is constructed as a citizen’s 
right in itself, without assumptions about future productive behavior. Quite the contrary – basic 
income becomes a means to opt out from oppressive working conditions and to increase 
freedom from domination through increased material independence. Assumptions about 
activity are, if anything, related to the citizen’s rights and tool for political participation. In the 
emancipation discourse, social groups are perceived primarily in relation to the capitalist 
production system and basic income becomes a tool for freedom in the sense of being able to 
say no to powerholders. Poverty and the transformation of work is understood to be caused by 
an increasingly unequal division of labor and capital: 
Poverty and exclusion are a natural result of the current economic system. Poverty 
understood as the lack of economic resources to cover basic needs has increased as a 
consequence of the crisis and social cuts; exclusion understood as the lack of an access to 
the mechanisms of human development, work and dignified housing, life-long education, 
health, affective ties, communal networks, political participation, is also growing in many of 
its dimensions, but neither poverty nor exclusion appeared with the crisis. Both came and 
still come from the hand of an unequal and unsustainable model of growth and hierarchical 
social relations, of privilege and domination, of a capitalism of pals as they say […] 
(ES_20.12.2016) 
Poverty and exclusion are perceived as natural results of an unjust economic system, but within 
this discourse, these systemic changes are brought into the debate as objects of political 
deliberation rather than perceiving them external to it, as was the case within the activation 
discourse. The same speaker continues by expanding the concept of unequal power to 
patriarchal relations and exploitation, appealing to basic income as a tool for citizen’s 
emancipation: 
Patriarchy, exploitation and violence are parts of the same scene, of the same story, all of 
them creators of loneliness, stigmas and marginalization. It is necessary to question, with 
facts and not only declaratively – [to which] we are very accustomed to – the heart of the 
predominant economic and financial relations with any necessary audacity. Citizen’s basic 
income and policies of proximity must be situated at the heart of the public strategy. 
(ES_20.12.2016) 
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Basic income is justified through a critique of the unjust accumulation of wealth and its 
‘perverse’ results, and as a means for fairer distribution of wealth in the society:  
We are talking about a tool which will not resolve all of the problems of our society – the 
most important one, to our understanding, is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
few – but yes it will permit to resolve one of its most perverse consequences, namely, to end 
with poverty and social exclusion. (ES_2.10.2007) 
[…] we are not going to deny that what is the priority is to make an effort for socializing the 
wealth in favor, as we say, of the popular classes, but basically and first of all the combat 
against exclusion and poverty. (ES_20.12.2005) 
 
Although it is stated that basic income will not resolve the most important problem of the 
society, namely the unjust accumulation of wealth to a small minority, the dynamic of capitalist 
production becomes problematized in the discourse. The ideal goal is, even, a society in which 
the production system is profoundly reshaped to redistribute wealth and political power equally 
to all citizens. Moreover, basic income is understood as a ‘clarification’ of citizen’s rights and 
emancipation of the ‘popular classes’. 
[…] it can be, without doubt, an approach which is much clearer, more efficient, more just 
and not exactly of more economic cost, but of better redistribution and clarification of the 
citizen’s rights”. […] “what is fundamental to us is to start to work in a committee on the 
meaning of the basic income, which is a very important option for that it would be possible 
to overcome with all rotundity the helplessness of many citizens facing a clearly unjust 
economic system”.  (ES_19.5.2005) 
[Basic income] is not a small reform but [instead] it profoundly innovates to the bottom, in 
essence, questions, and goes beyond the normative and programmatic foundations of our 
social welfare state. To say it graphically, the universal suffrage in the 20th century perhaps 
represented something that could be similar for the democracy than what basic income 
could be for the 21st century for this social welfare state, namely, a truly qualitative jump in 
the conception of social citizenship. (ES_2.10.2007)  
 
The emancipation discourse appeals to a Marxist perception of the world defined by a capitalist 
production system and talks to the popular classes as ‘us’ rather than appealing to national 
competence. Quite the contrary, the discourse is in fact in a critical relation towards the 
imperative of competitiveness which happens through accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
few. It indicates that, although from the epistemic governance perspective it may be 
disadvantageous to appeal to more ‘unorthodox’ assumptions about the social world, some 
politicians may use them if the political goal is wider socioeconomic transformation. Increasing 
the individual freedom and bargaining power of the workers in relation to the employers and 
women in relation to their families are goals related to basic income. The questions of bargaining 
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power and care work appeared only very marginally as goals in Finnish justifications, and when 
they did, they were not associated with the critique of the capitalist production system in this 
sense. 
The Spanish basic income proponents discuss basic income on an ideal level, without specifying 
more than that an apt basic income would not be any less than at the poverty threshold. The 
measure is perceived as part of a continuum of historical steps towards fulfilling democratic 
rights and basic income is perceived as the “political concretion of republican values in which 
our current democracy shall aim for culminating, namely, those of liberty, equality and 
fraternity” (ES_2.10.2007). In addition, justifications in the Spanish parliament appeal to 
developments of the discussion in other countries to highlight that basic income represents the 
next step in modernization:  
“Do the gentlemen of Ciudadanos and of the PP [Partido Popular] remember when you 
said that we were anti-system for considering the horizon of this proposal? What have you 
thought about when your friends at Davos and in Silicon Valley consider defending it? In 
Finland it is already starting to be pushed towards practice and I do not think they have had 
to put snipers to the border as José Carlos Díaz3 said. (Applauses). We shall see how the 
debate advances in the rest of the countries, but if we do not approve of it here beforehand, 
we will perhaps have to implement it due to a European directive. To finish, I would like to 
remind you that in the 19th century, education and public health care appeared utopian, and 
regardless of many of you, today they are reality. As Galeano4 said, the utopia is a horizon. 
You take two steps and the horizon distances itself ten steps further. But, of what use is the 
utopia? The utopia serves to walk, so let us keep on walking. (ES_2.2.2017)  
Basic income is indeed proposed even as a ‘utopian’ measure as opposed to a practical tweak to 
the existent system, but interestingly from a distinctively positive perspective. Parliamentarians 
from the major parties did not question citizen’s rights or the right to subsistence per se, but 
basic income was faced with strong opposition namely because it is most often deemed utopian 
or wildly unrealistic in practice. Within the popular classes’ emancipation discourse, basic 
income was understood as a basic right without any expected behavior on behalf of its receivers; 
the mere existence makes a citizen worthy of basic income. The link between new fundamental 
rights, universal basic income and the notion of citizenship take another turn when it was also 
connected to the context of Catalonian independence and ‘creating new fundamental rights’ in 
this sense: 
[...] everything you defend, we share [...] but not only this, also the installation of a universal 
basic income, funds to attack structural poverty [...]. But pay attention, our position is the 
                                         
3 a Spanish economist and a blogger 
4 A famous Uruguayan novelist  
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following one. To be able to generate new fundamental rights, to our understanding a 
constituent process is necessary. This is our thesis. In Catalonia we have the opportunity, I 
don’t know whether we will achieve it, to start a constituent process which would allow us 
to conquest new subjective rights that would not be limited to the leading principles of the 
Constitution but subjective rights, new fundamental rights, the reason for why we ask you 
for help. Because if in Catalonia we have the opportunity [...] it is evident that you pursue 
the same for the ensemble of the Spanish state, I am convinced that you will help us to make 
it possible and make it a reality [to create] this constituent process, which must culminate in 
the proclamation of the Republic of Catalonia. (ES_12.4.2016) 
The understanding about a fundamental change of work is essentially shared with the 
understanding of the Finnish parliamentarians, but the tone is different. Spanish 
parliamentarians justify for a basic income as a remedy against the threat of continuing 
disadvantage suffered by the workers. 
New technologies, as you know, allow production with less work. Where has this increase 
in productivity went to? [...] To the high income [groups], to the big entrepreneurs. If the 
tendency towards the advancement of robotization [...] continues, this gap between 
productivity and work will not cease to increase. […] The debate on this law allows to open 
a pathway to debate and reflect in these General Courts over basic income. (ES_2.2.2017) 
 
Basic income from this perspective appears as a necessity if one is to prevent greater suffering 
and inequalities which are, it is argued, inevitably coded into the global capitalist system. These 
in practical argumentation were linked to evidence on poverty rates in Spain as well as the 
insufficiency of current minimum income schemes in reaching the poverty threshold of those 
in need. Basic income is linked to the goal of increasing bargaining power and democratic 
participation of the working class and those living in poverty. This echoes Spanish justifications 
in which basic income is understood as a tool for material independence and thereon for fulling 
democratic citizenship (Raventós 2007; Raventós, Wark & Casassas 2012, 144). 
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Table 2. Summary of findings 
 
         Basic Income Discorse 
Objects of Epistemic Work Fixing the Safety Net 
Environment Securing basic needs efficiently, modernizing the 
social security system as goals 
Problems of social security system as a result of 
previous, short-term focused decision-making 
and ‘quick-fixes’. Basic income as a holistic, 
long-term oriented solution. 
Work as increasingly insecure source of income; 
transition from ‘traditional’ full-employment 
society to a new era mismatched with old 
benefits receiver categorizations 
Complicated, rigid, gapped benefit system. 
 Extending coverage (Spain) 
 Flexibilization (Finland) 
 
Actors and identifications 
 
Benefit receivers lacking control over the 
systemic complications resulting in their 
vulnerable positions 
 The poor, those in precarious work, 
women (Spain) 
 The unemployed, those in non-standard 
or ‘gig jobs’, entrepreneurs, students 
(Finland) 
 Diversification: of demographic groups 
(Spain); of individual life trajectories 
(Finland). 
Values and norms Combatting poverty and exclusion, providing 
for economic basic needs, enhancing societal 
sense of security as moral duties 
 Autonomy, humanity (decreasing 
suffering, enhancing well-being) 
 
                                                 Encouraging Activity (Finland) 
Environment Activating society and constant adaptability as 
goals  
Chronic unemployment as a challenge for 
economic growth and welfare state sustainability 
in future. 
Current benefits system enforces inactivity; 
Basic income enables people’s active capacities 
to be released  
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Actors and identifications Individuals and the nation as naturally striving 
towards activity; 
 The unemployed, small entrepreneurs 
and freelancers  
Values and norms active citizenship, growth, adaptability 
                           Emancipation (Spain) 
Environment Enhancing democratic rights and bargaining 
power of working class through economic 
independence as goals 
World characterized by the capitalist production 
system, patriarchy and exploitation  
Economic system naturally leading to 
accumulation of wealth to the hands of a small 
minority; enhancing automation and lack of 
collective bargaining will polarize inequalities 
and hardships faced by workers.  
Actors and identifications Relation between powerholders and the 
dominated as constant struggle 
 Workers, women, the poor, capitalists; 
Catalonia 
Values and norms Justice, democracy, freedom from domination  
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
 
This study has analyzed parliamentary debates on universal basic income in Finnish and Spanish 
national parliaments’ plenary sittings. The study has adopted the perspectives of domestication 
global models and epistemic governance for basic income field battles. The aim was to 
understand how the purpose of basic income is understood in the parliamentary debates and to 
what extend justifications for basic income share similarities across the case parliaments. 
Additionally, the analysis also led to finding important variation specific to each case parliament. 
Justifications for basic income evolved in both countries’ parliaments around the goal of fixing 
perceived problems in the existent social security safety net. Additionally, in Spain the main 
purpose of basic income was increasing the workers’ bargaining power and individuals’ 
autonomy, while in Finnish justifications the predominant purpose related to increasing activity 
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and labor market participation. The most dominant perception of the current circumstances in 
basic income justifications was that the labor markets have drastically changed and, hence, the 
social security system needs to be updated to current citizens’ needs. It was also expected that 
persisting long-term unemployment rates and the basic income related experiments in the two 
countries would appear in the parliamentary debates. The Finnish experiment was mentioned 
in the Spanish discussions, but the local experiment in Barcelona was not linked to basic income 
justifications in neither one of the parliaments. In both case contexts, the justifications for basic 
income did rely strongly on work and labor market effects, but in very different ways. 
From Spain, the data covered the pioneering debates of basic income in the national parliament 
which took place in 2005, whereas these debates on basic income in the Finnish parliament date 
back to 1980s and were not covered in the selected data. In Spanish parliamentary justifications, 
there was no evident change in basic income discourse over the observed periods of 2005–2007 
and 2015-2017. In the Finnish debates there was a minor change between 2005–2007 and 2015–
2017, in that the latter discussion emphasized basic income more as a tool for labor market 
activation rather than broader activities. Nevertheless, the activity discourse was the 
predominant one in the debates. These findings were in line with Johanna Perkiö’s (2018) 
previous work on the Finnish case, while similar analysis prior to this study had not been done 
on the Spanish case. It is possible to interpret the difference of basic income discourse between 
the case countries in the light of domestication and newness of basic income in those local 
contexts. The debates on basic income in Finland have existed for four decades and in Spain 
for the last two decades. This may explain why Finnish parliamentarians made virtually no 
references to national or international basic income thinkers, whereas their Spanish colleagues 
explicitly mentioned basic income thinkers such as Philippe Van Parijs and Daniel Raventós, 
the University of Louvain as the birth place of basic income, and the Basic Income Earth 
Network as influencers in the basic income discussion. 
In Finnish parliamentary debates the purpose of basic income was integrated to a mainstream 
discourse and to commonly shared goals such as securing economic growth and increasing labor 
market participation. On the other hand, it also narrowed down understandings of basic income, 
connecting it with the logic of incentivizing. In this discourse people’s behaviors can be 
primarily affected through monetary incentives, either by restricting them or increasing them. 
The claims are related to the stiffness of the social security system and incentive traps, which 
should be adapted to the needs of the labor market. In Spain, the purpose of basic income was 
predominantly articulated as a new citizen’s right and a tool for emancipation for those in 
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vulnerable positions. Basic income was appealed to as part of a historical continuum of citizen’s 
rights such as equal vote. The underlying understanding was that basic income provides fairer 
distribution of wealth among members of the society. Basic income here is a tool for enhancing 
economic independence which in turn is perceived as a necessary precondition for fulfilling 
democratic rights.  
The two country-specific discourses portray different perspectives to basic income. Within the 
emancipation discourse, basic income becomes a goal in its own, as it is perceived as a basic 
citizen’s right. This discourse could in principle resonate well in the context of the Spanish social 
assistance system, in which there is no final resort benefit for working-aged adults of unlimited 
duration except for few autonomous regions. On the other hand, in the concrete debates the 
overarching goal of emancipation was either prioritized as secondary or irrelevant by most 
parliamentarians. In Finnish parliamentary debates, basic income has been brought into an 
overall prevalent activation discourse, which could make the proposal approachable to many 
politicians. However, here the successfulness of basic income is conditioned on the positive 
behavioral effects it would allegedly cause. Linking basic income to rather modest goals of 
increasing activity rather than emancipating individuals is can be interpreted against the context 
of somewhat generous existing last resort benefits for the working-age population in Finland, 
although these are not unconditional like basic income. 
The process of analysis revealed that there was a wide consensus among parliamentarians over 
the need for fixing the safety net. The activity discourse was also a predominant one in Spain, 
but not in justifications for basic income. The emancipation discourse, on the other hand, was 
clearly shared only among those in favor of basic income in Spain. Normative resistance towards 
basic income was predominantly related to reciprocity, particularly granting ‘free money’ to 
working-aged citizens. Echoing Birnbaum (2019), basic income was challenged related to 
questions of need and target-efficiency, namely arguing that other more efficient measures could 
tackle the same issues. It was also consistently argued that basic income could have intended or 
unintended perverse consequences, such as furthering unemployment and social exclusion 
instead of tackling these. 
Justifications for basic income in the Spanish parliament came from members of minoritarian 
Leftist and Green parties, almost exclusively Catalonian regional parties, whereas in Finland 
parties from more diverse ideological backgrounds participated in justifying basic income. The 
analysis in the section 6.3. also shows that basic income was also connected with creating new 
fundamental rights in the Catalonian region, and thus basic income could be seen having 
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symbolic value within the larger context of creating new meanings for social citizenship and 
autonomy within the Spanish kingdom. The epistemic governance perspective and 
domestication studies suggest that politicians tend to appeal to the common good of the nation-
state, i.e. national competence and well-being, this holds true only partially in Spanish plenary 
session justifications for basic income. The assumed audience of the work of convincing in this 
case may not be other Spanish parliamentarians or the Spanish people as a whole, but rather, 
the local Catalan audience.  
On the other hand, it can be questioned whether it is indeed reasonable to assume that plenary 
sessions open a window to widely shared assumptions held in the society at large, as argued 
from the epistemic governance perspective. It seems plausible that politicians that strive to 
articulate narrow stakeholder interests as those of the whole nation to convince the public and 
themselves about what are realistic and desirable courses of action, leading to vague appeals for 
‘offering more opportunities’ or ‘enhancing social inclusion’. Yet, one may also question how 
the general public here should understood: who listens to the plenary sessions or searches the 
diaries on the internet to read them through? Most likely not many of those in very vulnerable 
positions, those struggling with long-term poverty or exclusion – indeed many of the intended 
target groups of the social benefits system. The case of Spanish justifications for basic income 
challenges the assumption from another angle: even in a national parliament, the assumed 
audience of some speeches may well be a regional one. To this regard it seems that Alasuutari’s 
(2016, 6) suggestion that national interest is the “only morally impeccable one” in the national 
parliaments’ political discourse does not hold, at least if national interest is equated with nation-
state. 
The choices made regarding the data and methodology in this study set some considerable 
limitations for interpreting the results. It should be bared in mind that plenary session recordings 
only represent but a tiny fraction of basic income related debates and developments in the case 
countries. In Spain, particularly, basic income virtually disappeared from parliamentary debates 
during the hardest years of the economic recession, but it simultaneously gained more interest 
among civil society actors. The other consideration relates to the data points: although the data 
included six years from both countries between 2005 and 2017, there are considerably more 
data points from the Finnish parliament than from the Spanish one. The main reason behind 
this is the expansion of mentions during the preparations of the basic income experiment.  
Finnish and Spanish parliamentary debates have provided an interesting example of 
domesticating basic income into the discussion on fixing the social security net and into the 
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predominant activation discourse (Finland), or, by contrast, linking basic income to the 
historical development of citizen’s rights and freedom (Spain). At present, basic income remains 
an unorthodox proposal in both case countries, although basic income related experiments have 
taken place in the most recent years. Even if politicians can state that they are in favor of shared 
values, ideals and definitions of the environment appealed to in justifications favoring basic 
income, there are many reasons for why they would not support the basic income proposal per 
se. In the case of Finland, for example, the coalition government that decided on a basic income 
experiment also implemented a strict activation model in 2018, which aimed for the same 
purpose – enhancing unemployed people’s activity – albeit through negative incentivization. 
Up until the recent decade, basic income has been a relatively unknown proposal for the public.  
Now there has been a clear expansion in policy attention and more basic income initiatives than 
ever taking place around the globe, from crowdfunded projects to public authorities who are 
trying out different basic income type schemes. Similarly, more empirical research than ever is 
now underway evaluating basic income in its various forms and in relation to local institutional 
and political dynamics. Basic income has been moving from a somewhat abstract ideal form 
discussion to concrete parliamentary debates, in which the purpose and prospects of basic 
income are questioned and refined. Moving onwards, it will be interesting to follow in what 
ways the expanding body of basic income research and the experiences from basic income 
experiments will be utilized in domesticating the proposal. At the same time, general discussions 
about the politics of basic income in the future can benefit from case studies that empirically 
examine what have been the main discourses related to basic income in different countries, as 
these may depict very different ways of perceiving the proposal. 
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Annex: Data   
 
Year Country Name Mentions 
2005 Spain ES_14.4.2005 Mesa del Congreso 8 
  ES_20.5.2005 Mesa del Congreso 8 
  ES_11.5.2005  3 
  ES_19.5.2005  5 
  ES_20.12.2005 2 
   Total 26 
 Finland FI_2.3.2005 1 
  FI_9.3.2005 7 
  FI_10.2.2005 1 
  FI_10.3.2005 6 
  FI_20.10.2005 4 
  FI_29.9.2005 3 
   Total 22 
2006 Spain ES_14.2.2006 1 
  ES_23.5.2006 1 
   Total 2 
 Finland FI_13.12.2006 1 
  FI_18.12.2006 8 
  FI_20.12.2006 1 
  FI_26.10.2006 4 
  FI_29.11.2006 1 
   Total 13 
2007 Spain ES_2.10.2007 71 
   Total 71 
 Finland FI_18.4.2007 1 
  FI_19.9.2007 1 
  FI_19.12.2007 1 
  FI_20.9.2007 1 
  FI_24.4.2007 2 
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  FI_25.4.2007 11 
  FI_26.4.2007 7 
   Total 24 
2015  FI_1.10.2015 13 
  FI_2.6.2015 9 
  FI_3.6.2015 9 
  FI_3.11.2015 1 
  FI_6.10.2015 5 
  FI_7.10.2015 14 
  FI_9.10.2015 39 
  FI_9.12.2015 15 
  FI_13.3.2015 1 
  FI_14.12.2015 3 
  FI_ 15.9.2015 1 
  FI_ 15.10.2015 5 
  FI_ 15.12.2015 1 
  FI_ 16.6.2015 1 
  FI_16.12.2015 8 
  FI_ 18.11.2015 2 
  FI_24.6.2015 2 
  FI_24.11.2015 3 
  FI_25.2.2015 1 
  FI_ 25.11.2015 5 
  FI_29.9.2015 9 
  FI_ 30.9.2015 2 
   Total 149 
2016 Spain ES_12.4.2016 1 
  ES_20.12.2016 1 
   Total 2 
 Finland FI_1.3.2016 1 
  FI_1.12.2016 2 
  FI_4.10.2016 5 
  FI_5.10.2016 1 
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  FI_6.4.2016 2 
  FI_6.9.2016 38 
  FI_8.11.2016 10 
  FI_8.12.2016 4 
  FI_9.2.2016 4 
  FI_9.11.2016 13 
  FI_12.12.2016 3 
  FI_14.4.2016 13 
  FI_14.10.2016 30 
  FI_14.12.2016 7 
  FI_16.12.2016 64 
  FI_18.2.2016 10 
  FI_18.5.2016 3 
  FI_19.4.2016 8 
  FI_19.12.2016 1 
  FI_20.9.2016 16 
  FI_20.12.2016 9 
  FI_21.6.2016 8 
  FI_21.9.2016 16 
  FI_22.6.2016 10 
  FI_23.9.2016 12 
  FI_24.2.2016 1 
  FI_25.10.2016 246 
  FI_27.9.2016 1 
  FI_29.9.2016 1 
  FI_31.3.2016 12 
   Total 551 
2017 Spain ES_2.2.2017 20 
  ES_4.55.2017 1 
  ES_14.6.2017 1 
  ES_28.9.2017 1 
  ES_29.11.2017 1 
   Total 24 
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 Finland FI_4.5.2017 3 
  FI_4.10.2017 1 
  FI_4.12.2017 2 
  FI_7.12.2017 5 
  FI_8.12.2017 3 
  FI_11.12.2017 8 
  FI_13.12.2017 1 
  FI_14.2.2017 1 
  FI_15.2.2017 3 
  FI_16.11.2017 2 
  FI_17.1.2017 1 
  FI_20.6.2017 15 
  FI_20.9.2017 1 
  FI_21.6.2017 28 
  FI_23.11.2017 1 
  FI_27.9.2017 2 
  FI_30.5.2017 1 
   Total 78 
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